








Department of Economics 
 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements  
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
Colorado State University 











 Advisor: Ramaa Vasudevan 
 
 Alexandra Bernasek 
















Copyright by Russell Bramblett 2017 











Are Sanctions Motivated by Protectionism: This paper attempts to answer the question, “are 
sanctions the U.S. imposes on foreign countries motivated by trade protectionism”? Using 
sanctions votes in the U.S. House of Representatives from 2005-2015 and industry data within a 
given Congressional District, the empirical analysis indicates that with some types of sanctions 
bills and certain industries, Representatives’ votes may be affected by the prevalence of 
industries within their district.  
The Necessary Conditions for Environmental Sanctions: Drawing from current environmental 
economics literature, this paper looks at the necessary conditions for carbon abatement and 
models the path to optimal carbon abatement using a country-level welfare-maximization model 
to illustrate the effects of pollution awareness on consumption optimization. This paper finds that 
social marketing is necessary for a country to increase its welfare by imposing environmental 
sanctions. 
A Time-Series Analysis of U.S. Sanctions Imposed from 1990 to 2015: Using time-series 
analysis and forecasting, this paper assesses the effects of sanctions using a dataset of U.S. 
imposed sanctions from 1990-2015. The analysis indicates that, 1. GDP is a good predictor of 
development assistance after a sanction, 2. export dependence is a good predictor of military 
expenditures after a sanction, and 3. contrary to previous research, constrained democracies are 
affected more by sanctions than pure democracies.  
iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1 
1.2. Sanctions in the United States.................................................................................................. 3 
1.3. Recent Literature ...................................................................................................................... 8 
1.4. Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 14 
1.5. Empirical Model .................................................................................................................... 15 
1.5.1. Data ................................................................................................................................. 15 
1.5.1.1 Effectiveness/Partisanship Variables ......................................................................... 15 
1.5.1.2. House Vote Data ....................................................................................................... 18 
1.5.1.3. Industry/Occupation Data ......................................................................................... 19 
1.5.2. Regression Specification ................................................................................................. 19 
1.5.3. Regressions Evaluation Method ...................................................................................... 20 
1.6. Results .................................................................................................................................... 21 
1.6.1. All Votes to Impose Sanctions ........................................................................................ 22 
1.6.2. Import and Export Ban Specific Sanctions ..................................................................... 26 
1.6.2.1. Export Ban ................................................................................................................ 27 
1.6.2.2. Import Ban ................................................................................................................ 29 
1.6.3. Robustness Check ........................................................................................................... 30 
6.3.1. Trade Bills to Increase Trade ....................................................................................... 33 
1.6.3.2. Bills to Increase Trade w/o Natural Gas ................................................................... 35 
1.7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 36 
2.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 39 
2.2. Current literature .................................................................................................................... 41 
2.3. Model and Theoretical Basis ................................................................................................. 51 
2.4. Model Calibration .................................................................................................................. 54 
2.5. Pollution Awareness Function ............................................................................................... 57 
2.6. Implication and Recommendations........................................................................................ 62 
3.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 65 
3.2. Literature ................................................................................................................................ 66 
3.3. Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 69 
3.4. Data ........................................................................................................................................ 73 
iii 
 
3.5. Results .................................................................................................................................... 77 
3.5.1. Results by indicators ....................................................................................................... 78 
3.5.2. Household Consumption ............................................................................................. 79 
3.5.3. Government Consumption ........................................................................................... 79 
3.5.4. Military Expenditures .................................................................................................. 81 
3.5.5. Economic Class ........................................................................................................... 81 
3.5.6. Development Assistance.............................................................................................. 84 
3.5.7. Health Expenditures .................................................................................................... 84 
3.5.8. Employment................................................................................................................. 86 
3.4.2. Results by Country Type ................................................................................................. 88 
3.4.3. Political Systems.......................................................................................................... 94 
3.4.4. GDP ............................................................................................................................. 96 
3.4.5. Export as a Percent of GDP ......................................................................................... 97 
3.5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 98 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 100 
Are Sanctions Motivated by Protectionism Appendix................................................................ 103 
Regression with occupations within Industries ....................................................................... 103 
Sanctions Bills ......................................................................................................................... 107 
Sanctions since 1990 not included in study ............................................................................ 109 
All Active Sanctions................................................................................................................ 116 
Variables.................................................................................................................................. 122 
Code Appendix ........................................................................................................................ 129 
Necessary Conditions for Environmental Sanctions Appendix .................................................. 148 
Code Appendix ........................................................................................................................ 148 
A Time-Series Analysis of Sanctions from 1990-2015 Appendix ............................................. 152 
Country Averages .................................................................................................................... 152 
Executive Orders ..................................................................................................................... 153 







Are sanctions motivated by trade protectionism?  
There is a rich body of literature that analyzes the various types of sanctions, and in nearly all of 
the research, the authors’ present evidence on why sanctions succeed or fail. Most of this research 
is in agreement and most of it is intuitive. While this evidence may not be common knowledge, 
Congress has been the subject of information campaigns including Hufbauer’s efforts where he 
and his colleagues printed out sanctions notecards for Congress (Hufbauer et al., 2007). These 
cards contained rules-of-thumb for the types of sanctions that would be effective in a given 
situation. Yet, even armed with this information we still see many sanctions imposed when there 
is a low probability of the sanction’s success. If there is not a high chance of success for the 
sanction, and the sanction is implemented anyway, the question becomes, why was a sanction 
imposed when common sense (and the research) indicates it will not be effective? 
To begin to answer this question, this paper will look at the 11 most recent sanctions voted on by 
the U.S. House of Representatives. If the sanction is likely to be effective (sanction effectiveness 
is discussed in section 1.3), then a “yes vote” by a congressperson on a sanction bill can be assumed 
to be motivated by the stated rationale (i.e. if the stated goal of the sanction was to deter military 
action in a foreign country and the sanction has a high probability of success, then the vote is 
assumed to be motivated by a congressperson’s desire to curtail the foreign military action). If 
however, there isn’t a high probability that a given sanction will have the stated effect, then we 
have to delve a bit deeper into the reason a congressperson voted for it. One possible motivation 
for observed voting patterns is that industries within the representatives’ district will benefit from 
the reduction (or increase) in trade. This paper investigates this motivation.  
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In the sanctions literature, there is a strong focus on whether or not sanctions are effective in a 
given situation, while in the voting literature, within the political science literature, there isn’t 
much on the topic of sanctions-specific voting. For example, Bartels (2000) looks at congressional 
voting behavior, but addresses the question of partisanship in Congress; and Clinton (2006) and 
Miller and Stokes (2014) focus their analysis on the constituency’s influence on votes. In section 
1.3, sanction-effectiveness literature will be discussed further, but suffice to say, these two 
branches of study have remained separate. This paper will bridge this gap and offer some insight 
into one of the possible motivations for the U.S. House of Representatives voting for or against a 
sanction: constituency. 
The notion that some sanctions are veiled protectionism is not a new, according to Copeland, Jolly 
and Thompson (2011), the revision of the Cuban embargo in 2000 was due to political pressure 
from the agribusiness.  The issue with this sort of voting behavior is that this manner of trade 
policy is in violation of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), which formed the 
basis of the World Trade Organization (WTO). As provided for by Article 21 of the 1994 revision 
of the GATT, counties may limit trade for the purposes of “war or other emergency of international 
relations” and this is the article generally invoked when sanctions are imposed. Considering the 
Cuban embargo, according to the GATT this embargo is only allowed if there is an emergency, 
and it would be difficult to define “appeasing domestic industry” as an emergency.  
In this paper I find evidence indicating that, controlling for other factors, sanctions may be 
motivated by trade protectionism. This implies that some of the sanctions levied by the U.S. are 
more akin to trade policy than emergency international measures and therefore could be contested 
at the WTO. While the specific impacts are beyond the scope of this paper, this paper will outline 
a reasonable method for determining when protectionist policies are issued under the guise of 
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sanctions. This method consists of controlling for partisanship and rational motivations (other than 
protectionism), then assessing whether there is a relatively high concentration of people within a 
given congressional district who would directly benefit from a stricter trade relationship with the 
country/industry being sanctioned.    
The paper is setup as follows: section 1.2 will introduce how sanctions are implemented in the 
United States; in section 1.3, the relevant literature will be discussed, as well as the effectiveness 
of various types of sanctions; in section 1.4, I will setup a model for answering the question of 
whether sanctions votes are motivated by trade protectionism; in section 1.5, I will describe the 
data used in this analysis; in section 1.6, I will present the empirical results; and in section 1.7, I 
will discuss the implications of the results and outline areas for future work. 
1.2. Sanctions in the United States 
 
In order for this paper to be consistent with other sanctions literature, the country that imposes a 
sanction will be referred to as the ‘sender’ and the country upon which the sanction is levied will 
be referred to as the ‘target.’ For example, when the United States imposed a sanction on Iran, the 
U.S. was the sender and Iran was the target.  
Sanctions can take two broad forms: embargo and export restrictions. Embargo, such as the recent 
oil embargo on Iran, prohibits people and companies in the sender’s country from purchasing 
exports that originate from the target country. Conversely, a sanction that imposes export 
restrictions prohibits people or companies in the sender country from selling goods or services to 
the target country. Of these two types of sanctions, the export controls are the more common 
(Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, & Oegg, 2007), as they are easier to implement. There is also a hybrid 
form of a sanction, one that targets the financial systems or industry in a country. These are 
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generally aimed at blocking investment in a target country or limiting the target country’s access 
to the global financial system.   
While trade relations in the United States are under the purview of the U.S. Congress, Congress 
has granted significant powers to the President to impose sanctions on other countries. This began 
shortly after the First World War when Congress passed the Trading with the Enemy Act which 
allows the President to impose sanctions on countries in times of war. This Act was expanded in 
the mid-1930’s and added financial markets to the President’s authority. While there are many 
pieces of legislation that deal with the President’s authority to levy sanctions, the most important 
are the Export Administration Act1 (EAA) of 1979 and the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act2 (IEEPA) of 1977.  
The EAA gives the President the authority to control exports for the purposes of, 1. Limiting the 
military capacity of a foreign country; 2. Furthering a U.S. foreign policy goal; and 3. Prevent 
depletion of goods in the U.S. The EAA gives the President broad authority to restrict the flow of 
goods from the U.S. to other countries for any of the stated purposes. The IEEPA is broader in the 
controls it grant the President, but more limited in the situations under which it can be used. The 
IEEPA can only be used when “unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national 
emergency has been declared,” but it allows the President to fully control all financial transaction 
made from or to the U.S. and all imports and exports. In situations where a president freezes assets, 
they are doing so under the provisions of the IEEPA.  





Of note, however, is that the President has less latitude to limit imports, and because of this the 
majority of the sanctions imposed by the U.S. take the form of export controls.  
This paper however, will not focus on sanctions issued by the President, but due to the prevalence 
of sanctions by executive orders, a discussion of presidential authorities is appropriate.  
This paper is looking specifically at sanctions voted on by the U.S. House of Representatives from 
2005 to 2015, and these sanctions can be export controls, embargos, or limitations on the financial 
system. In the 2005-2015 timeframe the Presidents have signed about 50 executive orders related 
to sanctions, while the Congress has only voted on 13 sanctions. As such, this paper will not be an 
exhaustive look at sanctions, but rather a specific look at the House of Representative’s role as a 
sanctions sender.  These are more important sanctions to analyze because, as can be seen in figure 
1.2, the sanctions levied by Congress are broader in scope and will have the more significant 
impact on trade between the U.S. and the target country.  
This time period is a bit unusual because, according to Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott and Oegg (2007) 
the number of sanctions episodes where Congress was involved was more than half, on average, 




FIGURE 1.1 - CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN SANCTIONS. CHART 1940-1999 PORTION OF CHART 
REPLICATED FROM HUFBAUER ET AL. (2007) PP. 135 
Executive Orders have become increasingly popular for sanctions in the past two decades which 
has reduced the need for specific Congressional action. So, while the U.S. is currently targeting 26 
countries/organizations with sanctions (see appendix for details), these sanctions have primarily 
been instituted through Presidential action.   
There were 14 sanctions issued by Congress from 2005 to 2015; however, the sanctions against 
Russia and Moldova in 2012 had other non-sanction related legislation attached to them and the 
2014 sanction against Venezuela was done by a “suspension of the rules,” which means that the 
House of Representative passed the bill without voting on it. While there were 14 sanctions issued 





































FIGURE 1.2 - SANCTION TARGET BY PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 1990-2004 AND 2016-2017 
 
Sanctions generally target multiple things within a country. Figure 1.2 shows the sanctions outside 
the study period and figure 1.3 shows the sanctions inside the study period, both of which are 
broken out by the target of the sanction (in percent). In figure 1.2 we can see that 100% of the 
sanctions issued through executive order target exactly three things: real property, financial assets, 
and restrict certain people from entering the country. The charts also show that Congress generally 
targets industries when they issue a sanction. Additionally, looking at the within-country of targets 
of the sanctions enacted from 1990 to 2004 and 2016 to 2017 (the out of sample sanctions), and 
the within-country of targets of the sanctions imposed by Congress during the study period, 2005-
2015, we can see that the percentages are fairly similar (figures 1.2 and 1.3), making 2005-2015 a 















































FIGURE 1.3 - SANCTIONS TARGETS 2005-2015 (CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS ONLY) 
 
An interesting aside is that some states within the U.S. impose their own sanctions on other 
countries. For example, in the late 90s Massachusetts discouraged companies from business 
dealings in Burma. As described in Elliott and Hufbauer (1999), “the European Union and Japan 
have requested formal WTO consultations over a Massachusetts law penalizing companies doing 
business in Burma.” This type of sanction, while interesting, will not be considered in this research. 
1.3. Recent Literature  
 
The literature surveyed below establishes a baseline for the conditions under which sanctions are 
effective, and those conditions can be distilled down to three points:  
1. Sanctions are more effective against democracies than other forms of government 
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2. Sanctions are more effective against allies than enemies (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, & Oegg, 
2007), (Davis & Engerman, 2003) 
3. Sanctions are more effective to achieve small goals (foreign military impairment, 
disruption of military adventurism, policy change) than for larger goals (affect political 
change/regime change) (Elliott & Haufbauer, 1999), (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, & Oegg, 
2007), (Ang & Peksen, 2007), (Peksen, 2009), (Levy, 1999). 
As can be seen in the chart below (figure 4), only 34 percent of sanctions since 1940 have been 
successful. And while ‘effecting modest policy changes’ sanctions have a slightly better than 
fifty/fifty chance of being effective, for all other stated goals the odds are that the sanction will 
fail.   
 
FIGURE 1.4 - EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS BY GOAL. CHART REPLICATED FROM 
HAUFBAUER ET AL. (2007) PP. 159 
For all sanctions where Congress had a role from 2005 to 2015, none of the sanctions targets 
were democracies (based on the Polity IV definition), and two sanctions had a stated goal of 



















in this paper have a high probability of failure. And if there was a good chance that the sanctions 
would not achieve the stated policy goal, one can reasonably suppose there is another motivation 
for imposing them.  
Looking more in-depth at the sanctions literature we can see there is an abundance of literature 
that discusses reasons for a sanction’s success or failure. The remainder of this section will look 
more in-depth at the literature to add some additional data to the bullet points presented at the 
beginning of this section.  
Eaton and Engers (1999) developed a game theory approach to sanctions that initially posits the 
simple argument that if a sanction works, that implies the target underestimated the sender’s 
resolve. And conversely, if a sanction does not meet its stated goal, it implies an underestimation 
on the sender’s part of the target’s cost of compliance.  
Eaton and Engers (1999) also note the strategic nature of sanction; how the sanction could be a 
signal, and this signal could be reciprocated by the target. Their paper further argues that if neither 
the target nor the sender have sufficient information on the cost of the sanctions, non-compliance 
may result.  
The authors caution that: 
 “Any analysis of situations in which senders actually resort to taking measures can paint 
a misleading picture of the role of sanctions in the international order: a measure may be 
taken only in rare instances when a sender thinks that it can accomplish something, or in 
rare instances when a target fails to submit to the sender’s will. We do not wish to imply 
that empirical analysis of sanctions is futile. Examination of situations in which measures 
have been taken has shed light on a number of dimensions of how sanctions work. But any 
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attempt to quantify their effectiveness must consider the circumstances that lead to their 
use in the first place. Doing so requires an econometric approach more firmly embedded in 
theory.” (Eaton & Engers, 1999) 
 
While this paper will not model sanctions in a game theory context, the previous excerpt will be 
taken seriously. Knowing that sanctions are largely strategic in nature, strategic behavior will be 
considered in the empirical analysis.  
Davis and Engerman (2003) investigate the effectiveness of sanctions when the target and sender 
are allies. They address the significance of the relative size of the economies of the target and 
sender countries, and the long-term economic consequences of sanctions on both the target and the 
sender countries. The first conclusion of their analysis was that sanctions against allies are more 
effective that sanctions against enemies –which in part is due to allies having stronger trade ties 
than non-allies. The second point the authors made was that the sanction’s sender usually has a 
much larger economy than that of the target country. The final point of their paper was that after a 
sufficient amount of time has passed, the target country is usually able to locate substitute 
consumers and suppliers, which will blunt the effect of sanctions long-term. Thus, according to 
Davis and Engerman (2003), sanctions are effective in the short-term, against allies, and against 
relatively small economies.  
Elliott and Hufbauer (1999) looks at the effectiveness of sanctions and the targeted issues of 
sanctions. They come to two conclusions: since the end of the cold war, sanctions have targeted a 
wider variety of issues (humanitarian, civil, terrorism, etc.); and in the three decades following 
1970, about a quarter of the sanctions that were levied were successful. Which of course implies 
12 
 
that three-quarters of the sanctions were failures, possibly because of the widened scope, or of 
importance to this paper, that sanctions were grounded in the need to appease the constituency. 
The latter reason was discussed by Elliott and Hufbauer (1999) but it was not tested empirically.  
This paper investigates this hypothesis empirically using more recent data to test this assertion.  
Levy (1999) looks at the how to measure the effectiveness of sanctions using the specific case of 
the sanctions targeted at South Africa during apartheid. He concludes that the role of sanctions in 
ending apartheid in South Africa were overstated. While this conclusion is interesting, it is the 
methodology employed to reach this conclusion that is more relevant to this paper. Levy (1999) 
looked at a variety of economic and social factors that could have affected the political change at 
the time the sanctions were imposed and determined that the cause of the economic upheaval was 
not necessarily due to the sanctions, and therefore the sanctions may not have had a significant 
impact on the political outcome. The analysis in Levy (1999) paper implies that sanctions that are 
intended to affect political change are not as effective as sanctions that target other issues.   
Marinov (2005) describes variables that makes sanctions more or less successful, and the 
institutions that are necessary in the target country for sanctions to be effective. For example, 
according to Marinov (2005), democracies are more susceptible to regime change than the 
alternative forms of government and therefore the sanctions levied against democratic countries 
are more likely to be successful than those targeted at autocracies. Two other key findings from 
Marinov (2005) are that when leadership changes, there is usually a change in the policy targeted 
by the sanctions and that imposing sanctions on dictators is not very effective.  
Escriba-Folch (2012) details the cost benefit analysis, performed by various regime types, to 
determine whether they should change policies or not after a sanction has been implemented. In 
general, sanctions reduce the resources available to a country’s government, and thus, “the 
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executive tries to determine the mix of budgetary trade-offs that will maximize support” (Escriba-
Folch, 2012) after the resource reduction. Escriba-Folch (2012) find that, 1. personalist regimes 
(i.e. hereditary dictatorships) repress while other authoritarian regimes simply make transfers to 
their support base; 2. if there are abundant natural resources, the length of the authoritarian regime 
is extended; and 3. military regimes are the only regimes that do not increase repression as a result 
of sanctions. Military regimes increase wages to the military and only slightly increase repression 
on the people (though the last result was not significant). Their conclusion therefore is that 
personalist regimes are most at risk of destabilization from sanctions.  
Peksen (2009) conclude that more sanctions result in more human rights abuses. Peksen (2009) 
only used democracy as a dummy variable and did not consider the other regime types. Peksen 
(2009) does not speak to the effectiveness of the sanctions, but cautions that while a set of sanctions 
may be effective, it is likely that there will be some human rights abuses along the path to political 
change. Peksen concludes his paper by recommending diplomatic tools instead of economic tools 
to end human rights abuses.  
Peksen and Ang (2007) study what contributes to the effectiveness of sanctions. The authors find 
that perception of the issue by both the sender and target countries will affect the outcome of the 
sanctions. If people in the target country, for example, perceive that their government is acting in 
the best interest of the people and the sanctions are simply the tool of a distant warmonger, then 
the sanctions are unlikely to bring about the intended result.  
Hufbauer et al. (2007) takes an exhaustive look at 174 different sanctions episodes since the 
beginning of the 1900s, using regression analysis to determine which types of sanctions are most 
effective against which types of targets and for which objectives. The research is the most 
comprehensive looks at the topic of all the literature surveyed. Firstly, it makes two important 
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contributions to sanctions research: it empirically tests many of the assertions made by other 
authors simultaneously and it makes some simple policy recommendations based on the findings. 
Combining the independent variables into a single regression ensures the model in Hufbauer, Gary; 
et al (2007) is correctly identified, and it provides some confirmation that the results obtained by 
other authors independently will hold when they are all tested at the same time. The second 
contribution is that the findings are published in format which is more accessible to the general 
public and the congress than an academic journal, which was discussed in the first section.  
1.4. Methodology 
 
While the true motivation for a representative’s vote is tough to get at, there is one motivation that 
can be tested: representatives vote on the bill because their constituency directly benefits from 
restricting trade. The method for testing this rationale for voting requires data on sanction bills, 
data on votes, data on sanction effectiveness, and data on industries/occupations within a given 
congressional district.  
The expectation is that if a sanction is motivated by trade protectionism, there would be an increase 
in the probability that the bill will receive a ‘yes’ vote by a congressperson from a district where 
there is a higher than average density of workers from industries that are in direct competition with 
the industries targeted by the sanctions. The confounding factor, of course, is whether the sanction 
in likely to achieve its stated objective.  
If trade sanctions are veiled trade protectionism, the target of the sanctions should matter, whereas 
the potential effectiveness should not. In other words, the expectation is that if a congressperson’s 
district is competing with an exporter, then a trade embargo reducing competition is the relevant 
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outcome. Replacing a regime in a foreign country, for example, would be a secondary concern, if 
it is a concern at all.  
To test this, each of the 4353 votes from each of the sanctions bills from 2005 to 2015 will be 
analyzed. If a relatively higher percentage of the population is in an industry that would be affected 
positively (negatively) by the sanction, then there should be a significant and positive (negative) 
coefficient on this variable in the regression, which will imply the odds of a representative voting 
for the bill are high (low). In addition, a vector of independent variables for sanctions effectiveness 
similar to those used in Hufbauer et al. (2007) will be added to the regressions to control for when 
the sanction has a high probability of success.    
1.5. Empirical Model 
 
1.5.1. Data 
To answer the question of whether sanctions are motivated by trade protectionism, I developed a 
model that includes specific information on the industries affected by each sanction, the stated 
objective of each sanction, the characteristic of each sanction target, the House of Representative’s 
votes on each sanction, and the relative size of the occupations/industries within each 
congressional district. 
 
1.5.1.1 Effectiveness/Partisanship Variables 
We will consider six variables relevant for voting behavior on sanctions. Five of these variables 
come from Hufbauer et al. (2007): sanctions goals (there are three different goals); regime type; 
                                                          
3 From 2005-2009, there were 435 congressional districts, and beginning in 2010 there were 438. Also, for some 
votes, there were empty seats in the House, which resulted in fewer than 435 or 438 votes.  
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and prior relationship between the U.S. and the sanction target. One of the variables comes from 
Bartels (2000): partisanship.  
For the sanctions goals variables, Hufbauer et al. (2007) find that if the sanction goal is military 
impairment (denoted goalMI), policy/political change (denoted goalPC), or the disruption of 
military adventurism (denoted goalMil), the sanction is more likely to be successful than if the 
goal of the sanction is regime change (denoted goalRC). The intuition behind this is that if 
sanctions goals that are less costly to a nation the sanction will have a high chance of success 
(Hufbauer et al, 2007). Next, if the sanction target country is a democracy, the sanctions are more 
likely to be effective than if they target other government types. This is also intuitive because if 
the sanction affects the population of a country and that population has an active role in the political 
system, then the sanction has a higher probability of success (Hufbauer et al., 2007). Finally, if the 
relations prior to the sanctions between the U.S. and the target country were poor, then the 
sanctions are probably not going to be effective. There are a couple of reasons for this last point. 
One of the reasons discussed in Peksen and Ang (2007) is that people are more willing to bend to 
the will of their fiends than their foes, and the other discussed in Hufbauer et al. (2007) is that trade 
relationships are generally better between allies than between enemies. Therefore, there is both a 
political motive for a sanction’s effectiveness against friendly countries and an economic one. 
Based on these five things, a Representative could make an informed decision about whether or 
not to vote for a given sanction.  
To ascertain the type of industries impacted by the sanction and the stated goal of the sanction, I 
searched through the House of Representative rollcalls to find bills that were associated with 
sanctions and read through each of these bills in detail. The goal of the sanction was always clearly 
detailed in the bill as were the industries targeted. These data were converted to binary variables 
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for the regression. Of note, for these bills to be considered for analysis the sanctions bills had to 
be explicit in their intent. This excludes trade bills or bills that included trade. If the same, but 
amended, bill was voted on more than once, only the final vote was considered.  
The information on the target country was less straightforward than the other data. This required 
a bit of research into the type of relationship the U.S. has/had with the target country and that 
country’s political system. The issue is that there is a lot of gray area between a democracy and a 
dictatorship, and there is an equally amount of gray area between being allies with a country and 
being enemies with them.   
So, for each of these, following the methods detailed in Hufbauer et al. (2007), a three-category 
variable was created. For the political system variable, the country would get a 1 if it had free and 
fair elections, a 3 if it had a dictator, and a 2 if it did not fall into category 1 or 3. Data to score 
each country was based on a normalized Polity IV4 index for that country.  
For the prior relationship variable, the country would get a 1 if the prior relations were antagonistic, 
a 3 if the country was an ally of the U.S., and a 2 if neither 1 nor 3 was appropriate. All the countries 
scored either 1 or 2 using this criterion and since there were no allies being targeted, the scoring 
was based on whether there were sanctions on the country prior to the sanctions vote. If there were 
sanctions prior the sanctions vote being considered, the country would get a 1, otherwise it scored 
a 2.  
The scoring can be seen in the appendix.   
                                                          
4 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm  
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Since this research looks at voting behavior, it also makes sense to look at the party pressure aspect 
of votes. To account for this, I’ve added a partisanship variable (denoted votesWparty). Bartels 
(2000) addresses the issue of partisanship in voting.  Partisanship is accounted for using a “voting 
with party” variable and captures the political nature of voting as there are some cases where the 
leadership of a political party will encourage its members to vote a certain way, and the members 
vote in this way purely because of the suggestion. The voting with party variable is the percentage 
of the party that is voting the same way as the representative. The percentages will add to one and 
will include the percent of the party that voted yes, the percent that voted no and the percent that 
did not vote.  
 
1.5.1.2. House Vote Data  
I downloaded and parsed the clerk.house.gov5 page for rollcall data on each bill that went before 
the House of Representatives. The rollcall data catalogs what the vote was about, the members 
who voted, the members’ votes, and whether or not the bill passed. Since 2005 there have been 
about 6,000 rollcalls and for each rollcall there is one entry per Representative, which yielded 
about 3 million lines of data. Filtering this for the sanctions bills vote, there was about 5,000 
observations.  
While the rollcall data contains each representative’s name and state, it does not include their 
district. To assign each representative to a district, I went to the govtrack6 website for a list of 
every congressperson that served since 2005 and their district. Then I correlated the rollcall data 
and the district data. 
                                                          




1.5.1.3. Industry/Occupation Data 
The Census Bureau7 catalogs employed persons by industry/occupation by congressional district 
for the years 2000, 2005-2014. Taking the 2005-2014 dataset, I used linear interpolation to make 
a full data series from 2005-2015. This data was then translated into a location quotient for each 
district.  
The data for industry and occupation data was retrieved from the American Community Survey. 
This data includes five occupations and 13 industries. The occupations are: Management, Services, 
Sales, Natural Resources (Natural Resources includes farming, fishing and forestry), and 
Transportation. The industries are: Agriculture, Construction, Manufacturing, Wholesale, Retail, 
Transportation, Information, Finance, Professional, Education, Arts, Services, and Public 
Administration. The data also includes occupations within each industry, a total of 65 additional 
variables, which only appear in the appendix.  
 
1.5.2. Regression Specification 
All regressions were performed using multinomial logit. The multinomial version of this method 
is used because there are three decision variables: ‘yes’, ‘no’, and ‘notVoting’. Since all of the 
parameters can vary across the alternative (i.e. any independent variable can be paired with any 
dependent variable), the conditional logit will be the multinomial logit employed. According to 
Cameron and Trivedi (2009) this is the most well-behaved of the multinomial logits regressions 
and therefore is robust to the various challenges presented by using this type of cross-sectional 
dataset. 
For these regressions the “no” vote is the base category used for comparison. However, in a couple 
of the regressions, all representatives voted, so the “not Voting” option was not exercised. When 




this occurs, the model simply collapses to a binomial logit. The probability therefore is expressed 
as follows:  
Pr[ = | =   ] = e x −��� ′+e x −��� ′        (1.1) (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009) 
The coefficients are estimated using Maximum Likelihood. 
The interpretation for the coefficients are identical to the interpretation of the coefficient of an 
ordinary logit regression. Given that, 
= e x ′+e x ′        (1.2) (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009) 
The odds ratio can be written as: 
ln − = ′          (1.3) (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009) 
Thus, the coefficient  represents the increase (or decrease) in the odds ratio when an independent 
variable is increased by one. So, for example, if the coefficient in for a ‘yes’ vote on the ‘voting 
with party’ variable is 10, this indicates that the odds of a yes vote increases by 10 if the majority 
of the party is voting for the bill.  
 
1.5.3. Regressions Evaluation Method 
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is used to test all models to determine which model is a 
better fit for the data. The AIC is a log likelihood criterion with a penalty for number of degrees 
of freedom. The degrees of freedom component is very important for this paper because there is 
the option of using a model with 70 variables or a model with as few as six variables. The AIC: 
� =  − ln +   (1.4)  (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009) 
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Where  is the number of parameters and  is the likelihood function.  
As can be seen in the next section, this criterion is informative when comparing the model that 
only has the “Effectiveness/Partisanship” variables with the models with the occupation and 
industry data. It is clear that the Effectiveness/Partisanship variables model is inferior to the other 
models (as its AIC is higher), implying the prevalence of industry and occupations within a given 
congressional district has some effect on sanction voting behavior.  
1.6. Results 
 
The first set of regressions in table 1.1 looks at all the votes on bills that impose sanctions from 
2005 to 2015. The first regression only includes Effectiveness/Partisanship variables and is used 
as a point of comparison for the other two regressions in the same table. As can be seen from the 
AIC, the two regressions with industry and occupation variables are better fits for the data. The 
occupation regression includes the five occupational location quotients (Management, Services, 
Sales, Natural Resources, and Transportation). The industry regression includes the 13 industries 
(Agriculture, Construction, Manufacturing, Wholesale, Retail, Transportation, Information, 




1.6.1. All Votes to Impose Sanctions 




Occupations   Industries   
  Not Voting Yes   Not Voting Yes   Not Voting Yes   
term Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
(Intercept) 1.2   -0.86 ‡ 12.55   -5.99 ‡ -24.35   -51.97 ‡ 









goalRC -3.93 † -7.22   -3.91   -8.02   -3.89   -8.15 † 
goalMil -0.87 ‡ -0.15 ‡ -0.8 ‡ 0.06 ‡ -0.58 ‡ 0.06 ‡ 
goalMI -1.13   -1.5   6.48   -4.92   -18.2   -35.53   


















-15.52 * -34.17 
 
MgtOcc         -10.97   2.48           
ServOcc 




     
SalesOcc         -4.4   7.74           
NROcc 




    
TransOcc         -3.74   1.4           
AgInd 




ConInd                 4.17   8.15 ‡ 
ManInd 




WholeInd                 0.26   3.17 ‡ 
RetInd 




TransInd                 3.89   5.31 ‡ 
InfoInd 
        
3 * 2.37 † 
FinInd                 5.87 ‡ 9.2 † 
ProfInd 
        
3.37 * 11.66 ‡ 
EduInd                 11.02   23.68 † 
ArtsInd 




ServInd                 5.82   4.34 † 
PubInd 
        
3.09 † 6.31 * 
  Residual Deviance: 922.344  Residual Deviance: 837.7225  Residual Deviance: 800.1221  
  AIC: 950.344  
    AIC: 
885.7225  
    AIC: 
880.1221  
    
 
‡ - Significant at 1% 
† - Significant at 5% 




Coefficients on the “yes” vote when the vote is to impose sanctions and the votes are motivated 
by the stated goal are expected to look as follows:  
The goalPC variable is expected to be positive and significant. This variable is 1 when the stated 
goal of the sanction was to alter a political decision of the target. These are mainly focused on 
human rights issues. There was a significant negative coefficient on this variable in the Industries 
model. This suggests, that while the sanction was likely to have been ineffective, Representatives 
were about 34 times more likely to vote ‘no’ for it even when accounting for other factors.  
The goalRC variable is expected to be negative and significant. This variable is 1 if the stated goal 
of the sanction was change the political regime of a country. As was discussed in the literature 
section, this type of sanction rarely works. Representatives were about eight times less likely to 
vote ‘yes’ for this type of sanction, accounting for other factors. In the case of the first two stated 
policy goals, the voting behavior seems reasonable: the sanction is unlikely to achieve the stated 
goal, and representatives voted ‘no’ on it, accounting for other factors.  
The goalMil variable is expected to be positive and significant. This variable is 1 when the stated 
goal of the sanction was to diminish a country’s military capacity. Examples of this would be the 
Iran and North Korea sanctions, both of which were aimed at halting the countries’ nuclear 
weapons program.  While this variable does have a significant coefficient, the coefficient is very 
close to zero, which would not affect the odds ratio very much. Thus, the variable doesn’t appear 
to affect the vote and therefore does not meet expectations.   
The goalMI variable is expected to be positive and significant. This variable is 1 if the stated goal 
of the sanction was to halt a country’s military adventurism. Examples of this include the 1990 
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Iraq sanctions when Iraq invaded Kuwait and the 2014 Russian sanctions when Russia annexed 
Crimea. This variable is not significant.  
The voteWparty variable is expected to be positive and significant. This is the ‘voting with party’ 
variable and it meets expectations in two of the three regressions.  
The regime13 variable is expected to be positive and significant. This variable is 3 if the target 
country is a democracy, 1 if the target country is a dictatorship, and 2 if the regime type does not 
fall into the other two categories. This variable is significant in all three regressions; however, 
when interpreting the coefficient as an odds ratio, it is clear that the coefficient is too small to 
affect the vote.  
The relationsanc variable is expected to be negative and significant. This variable is 1 if the 
relations between the U.S. and the target country were antagonistic prior to the sanctions, 3 if 
relations were cordial, and 2 if relations were neither cordial nor antagonistic. Coefficients on this 
variable were not significant.  
For the ‘yes’ vote, across all three regressions, most of the sanctions-effectiveness variables did 
not meet expectations for if the sanctions were meant to be effective. The partisanship variable 
however, was a good fit.  
There is only one coefficient with an expected sign on the on the “Not Voting” portion of the 
regressions: voteWparty - negative and significant. The rationale for this is that if a representative 
did not want to vote on party lines, it is probably in their best interest to avoid voting altogether.  
Of note, the NotVoting choice variable was included in the regression for completeness, and does 
not contribute to this analysis except to confirm the expectations about the not voting variables. 
As such, the NotVoting choice variable does not warrant further discussion. 
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Starting with the Effectiveness/Partisanship Only regression in table 1.1 and looking in general at 
the implication, we can see that this is not the best model because 1. only the voteWparty variable 
meets expectations in a meaningful way, and 2. the AIC is higher in this model that the other two. 
With this, the model has served as a good point of comparison in that there is clearly more going 
on with the sanctions votes than can be accounted for with what will be referred to as the 
“Effectiveness/Partisanship” variables.  
Moving on the Occupations regression in table 1.1, there is only one significant coefficient and it 
is on the Natural Resource occupation variable. This is an intuitive result as this occupation would 
likely be impacted most by a sanction. Natural Resources includes renewable resources, and 
industries within it are extremely sensitive to the price of global commodities. In this case, if a 
sanction was imposed on an exporting country, the Natural Resources occupations would directly 
benefit. This regression is also an intuitive as it is likely that occupations, at a high-level, could 
influence a representative’s voting behavior. This regression, based on the AIC, is also a better fit 
to the data than the Effectiveness/Partisanship regression.  
The final regression in table 1.1, the Industry regression, is the best fit for the data. This is a 
convincing result as it is conceivable that the industries are organized enough to attempt to 
influence the result of a sanction vote. Looking at the industry regression, not only are all the 
results significant and positive, but generally the odds are quite high. This indicates that 
congressional districts with a relatively high percentage of industry are far more likely to have 
their representative vote in favor for a sanction than otherwise. While this regression alone makes 
a good case for sanctions as a form of protectionism, the remainder of this section will offer 
additional evidence to make an even more compelling case for this argument.  
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1.6.2. Import and Export Ban Specific Sanctions 
The next two models look at export and import bans in general. These are analyzed to determine 
if the location quotient of the manufacturing and wholesale trade occupations have some effect on 
the votes for import and export sanctions. In both of these regression sets, the industry, as well as 
the occupation-within-industry location quotients will be looked at. Unlike in the regression of all 
the sanctions, these regressions only include the sanctions that impose either an import or an export 
ban. Because these are specific cases that would help or hurt specific occupations within the 
manufacturing and wholesale industry, it seems reasonable that these occupations may have some 
impact on the import or export ban vote.  
The bills that included an export or import ban were aimed at either curtailing military adventurism 
or reducing a country’s military capability. Examples of these include the sanctions on Russia in 
2014 and the sanctions on Iran in 2012. As such, the goallPC and goalRC effectiveness variables 
were dropped.  
Different from the regression in table 1.1 the regression in table 1.2 and table 1.3 include industries 
and occupations within industries. The label for these variables is as follows: the industry is 
abbreviated with the first letters and the occupation is abbreviated with the second set. For 
example, ‘man Ind’ is the manufacturing industry as a whole, while ‘Man Serv’ is the service 




1.6.2.1. Export Ban 
TABLE 1.2 - SANCTIONS WITH EXPORT BANS 
 Manufacturing Industry Manufacturing 
Occupations 
Wholesale Industry Wholesale Occupations 
 
Not Voting Yes 
 
Not Voting Yes 
 
Not Voting Yes 
 
Not Voting Yes 
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‡ - Significant at 1% 
† - Significant at 5% 




The significant results of the export ban regression are intuitive: if there are relatively more people 
in occupations within the wholesale industry, there is a higher chance that the Representative will 
oppose a sanction that prohibits exports form the U.S. to a foreign country. The coefficient on the 
sales occupation within the wholesale industry is particularly high. One explanation for this could 
be that salespeople put some of their natural talent to use in fighting export bans. Generally, a vote 
is influenced in part by the efforts of lobbyist, if the vote is to curtail sales to foreign customers, 
then it is reasonable to assume the people receiving commissions from those sales would apply 




1.6.2.2. Import Ban 
TABLE 1.3 - IMPORT BAN SANCTIONS 
 Manufacturing Industry Manufacturing 
Occupations 























Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Int 3.13 ‡ 0.79 ‡ 3.52 ‡ 0.70 ‡ 2.98 ‡ 0.85 ‡ 3.32 ‡ 0.75 ‡ 
goalRC -1.15 † -1.75 ‡ -1.36 † -1.76 ‡ -0.95 * -1.73 ‡ -0.94 * -1.75 ‡ 
goalMI 4.28 ‡ 2.53 ‡ 4.88 ‡ 2.45 ‡ 3.93 ‡ 2.59 ‡ 4.25 ‡ 2.50 ‡ 
votWpt
y 
-159.45 ‡ 1.48 † -148.81 † 1.59 † -180.74 ‡ 1.21 * -161.69 ‡ 1.52 † 
regime 3.13 ‡ 0.79 ‡ 3.52 ‡ 0.70 ‡ 2.98 ‡ 0.85 ‡ 3.32 ‡ 0.75 ‡ 
relation 1.98 ‡ -0.96 ‡ 2.16 † -1.06 ‡ 2.04 † -0.88 ‡ 2.38 † -1.00 ‡ 
Man Ind -1.39 
 
0.84 ‡ 
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AIC: 617.2176  
  




‡ - Significant at 1% 
† - Significant at 5% 
* - Significant at 10% 
 
In the import bans regression, all the significant coefficients have signs that indicate when there 
are relatively more people within the manufacturing and wholesale industries within a given 
congressional district, there is a higher chance that the Representative will implement an import 
ban.  
In the export ban model, the prevalence of industry or occupation groups within a given 
congressional district decreased the odds anywhere from about 4 times to about 200 times. In the 
import ban model, the odds weren’t as large: having more industry or occupational representation 
in a congressional district only increased the odd of voting ‘yes’ on an import ban by about .5 to 
about 1. While the odds aren’t as extreme, increasing the odds by half is still a sizable increase and 
does indicate some link between the location quotient and the vote.  
The models for implementing import and export bans add some validity to the general regression 
with all industries in table 1.1. From this data, a strong case can be made for sanctions as veiled 
trade protectionism.  
 
1.6.3. Robustness Check  
To test the robustness of these results, I looked at explicitly trade-protectionist votes during the 
same period. There were 13 bills during the 2005-2015 timeframe that, if signed into law, would 
have generated more trade through the reduction of tariffs, or in most cases, brokered a deal with 
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a trading-block or country. While a lot of the trade-related legislation also included other issues, 
there were three bills that were solely directed at either increasing or decreasing trade: Trade with 
Vietnam in 2006; Andean Trade Preference Act in 2007; and Exporting Natural Gas in 2014. These 
are rare occurrences because trade bills are highly negotiated, as is evident by the number of times 
a given bill is voted on prior to it passing –one of the 13 trade bills was voted on four times (the 
average was a little over two). While there are likely many reason a representative would vote for 
adjusting the trade relationship with other countries, many of those reasons are contained within 
the “voteWparty” variable described above, and of importance to the findings of this study, the 
other reasons should be based on the prevalence of certain industries within a given district. All 
this to say that identifying a regression where the dependent variable is strictly whether a 
representative voted for or against a trade bill is a simpler than doing the same for regressions on 
sanctions vote. If the trade would benefit the representative’s constituency or the representative’s 
party is voting for the bill, then the representative would be expected to vote ‘yes’ on the 
legislation. The trade bills that were examined are all bills that will increase trade by increasing 
imports or allowing the exportation of natural gas.  
Industries within the U.S. would be expected to oppose the first two trade bills as these bills would 
decrease the price of the imported goods from the current domestic price to a price that is closer 
to the world price. This, of course, will decrease U.S. industry profits. As such, the expectation is 
that the coefficients on the industry and occupation coefficients will all be negative.  
In the case of the third bill, allowing natural gas exports, the price of natural gas will increase from 
the domestic price to a price that is closer to the world price. While this will increase the profits 
for the natural gas industry, this will increase input prices for every industry that relies on natural 
gas for production. With this bill, the expectation is that AgInd will benefit from the legislation, 
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and thus will have a positive coefficient, while the other industries and occupations will be hurt by 
the bill and therefore we expect a negative coefficient.  
The regressions in table 1.4 are done in two parts on the same column to make the results easier to 
read. Above the gray line is a regression for the bills with occupation location quotients and below 
the gray line is the regression with the industry data. The occupation within industry data 
regressions were left out as they were not generally significant in the main regression of sanctions 
bill (see appendix). These trade bill regressions are only intended to confirm the pattern of voting 
that would be seen if there was a protectionist motivation when enacting a sanction.  
Of note, the bills that were looked at were bills that actually passed, and the vote that was looked 
at was the vote where the bill was passed. The rationale for only using bills that pass, is that 
representatives may throw away a vote on legislation they know isn’t going to be enacted. Also, 
there is good reason for only counting one of the votes, as this robustness check is looking at voting 





6.3.1. Trade Bills to Increase Trade 
TABLE 1.4 - TRADE BILL REGRESSIONS  
Bill Vietnam Trade (2006)  Andean Trade Preference Act (2007) Export Natural Gas (2014) 
Variable Coefficient  
 
 Coefficient  
  
Coefficient  
(Intercept) 33.19 * 
 
 -19.21  
  
-1.37  
voteWparty 25.36 ‡ 
 
 182.08  
  
0.66  
MgtOcc -13.33 † 
 
 -13.41  
  
0.03  
ServOcc -8.73 ‡ 
 
 5.97  
  
-7.90  
SalesOcc -11.52 † 
 
 -34.65  
  
4.97  
NROcc -3.26  
 
 2.42  
  
4.93  
TransOcc -7.80 ‡ 
 
 -0.37  
  
-0.46  




    
(Intercept) -1.33 ‡ 
 
 -75.05  
  
-0.54 ‡ 
voteWparty 25.52 ‡ 
 
 990.50 ‡ 
  
1.01 * 
AgInd 0.10  
 
 -19.28  
  
0.605 ‡ 
ConInd -0.79  
 
 -99.22  
  
1.98 ‡ 
ManInd -2.00 ‡ 
 
 -83.94 ‡ 
  
1.09 ‡ 
WholeInd 0.54  
 
 36.91  
  
-0.41  
RetInd -0.29  
 
 -159.42  
  
2.53 † 
TransInd -2.09 ‡ 
 
 -28.33  
  
-0.88 * 
InfoInd 0.19  
 
 20.75  
  
-0.62  
FinInd -0.29  
 
 -108.99  
  
2.79 ‡ 
ProfInd -0.68  
 
 -97.99  
  
-1.02  
EduInd -3.44 ‡ 
 
 -108.30  
  
-3.91 ‡ 
ArtsInd -0.88  
 
 14.50  
  
-1.98 ‡ 
ServInd -0.59  
 
 46.88  
  
-0.93  
PubInd -0.07  
 
 -48.12  
  
1.25 ‡ 
‡ - Significant at 1% 
† - Significant at 5% 




In table 1.4 the significant coefficients meet expectations for protectionist trade legislations. The 
Vietnam and the Andean trade bills both have significant and negative coefficients on the industry 
variables, with the manufacturing industry having an impact in both cases. The natural gas 
regression in table 1.4 is a bit more complex than the others to interpret because while some 
industries would prefer to export their products, other industries would prefer to have lower gas 
prices. This can be seen in the regression, the transportation industry has a significant and negative 
coefficient, and the Agriculture and Natural resources industry has a significant and positive 
coefficient. This regression also meets expectation. Putting the two trade promotion bills into a 





1.6.3.2. Bills to Increase Trade w/o Natural Gas  
TABLE 1.5- TRADE BILLS W/O NATURAL GAS 
 
Bills to Increase Trade 
Variable Coefficient P-Value  
(Intercept) 32.80 0.10 * 
voteWparty 25.65 0.00 ‡ 
MgtOcc -13.24 0.05 † 
ServOcc -8.68 0.01 † 
SalesOcc -11.46 0.03 † 
NROcc -3.23 0.14  
TransOcc -7.78 0.01 † 
 
   
(Intercept) -1.60 0.00 ‡ 
voteWparty 25.76 0.00 ‡ 
AgInd 0.11 0.57  
ConInd -0.78 0.21  
ManInd -1.99 0.00 ‡ 
WholeInd 0.55 0.48  
RetInd -0.27 0.86  
TransInd -2.08 0.00 ‡ 
InfoInd 0.20 0.71  
FinInd -0.28 0.74  
ProfInd -0.66 0.38  
EduInd -3.40 0.00 ‡ 
ArtsInd -0.87 0.15  
ServInd -0.59 0.52  
PubInd -0.06 0.87  
‡ - Significant 1% 
† - Significant at 5% 
* - Significant at 10% 
 
 
The regression in table 1.5 does not have large coefficients on the industry variables (due to 
rounding they appear to be zero, yet they are significantly different from zero); however, the signs 
are all positive and the manufacturing industry’s coefficient is significant.  
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While three bills do not make for a significant dataset, it does corroborate the findings in the 
previous analysis: trade voting in likely influenced by the composition of the district, which isn’t 
surprising. This is the expected result and serves as a good robustness check for the previous 




Are sanctions motivated by trade protectionism? Our investigation of the question suggests that 
constituency explains much of the voting behavior.  
Controlling for other factors, the empirical analysis indicates there is a strong link between 
industries in the U.S. and sanctions on foreign countries. The linkage is most apparent in the 
regressions that use all votes to impose sanctions when looking at all industries (table 1.1). When 
the data is broken down by occupations, industries, and occupations within industries, for some 
sanctions, the results still tell the same story.  
While it would be difficult to predict the voting behavior of a Representative based solely on 
occupation data, industry data is a highly correlated with imposing sanctions in general and there 
is a strong theoretical link, which implies a strong link between voting pattern on sanctions bills 
and the concentration of occupation and industries within the representatives’ districts.  
Most industry location quotients are significantly correlated with a “yes” vote on sanctions and all 
of the industry coefficients have the sign that is expected. This implies industries are well 
organized and can affect sanctions votes while occupations may lack sufficient influence to affect 
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a sanction’s vote. This suggest that protectionism might be the underlying motive for at least some 
sanctions. Sanctions thus serve implicitly as a means of trade protectionism 
Follow-on analysis that might shed more light on this topic is industry lobbying effort and 
campaign donation data as they relate to sanctions votes. I suspect that campaign donations by 
industries to a representative are correlated with the prevalence of that industry within a given 
congressional district, and thus it may not lead to a different conclusion. The lobbying effort 
however, is probably a variable that affects each Representative in the same way and could lead to 
a different conclusion, but this is another area of research for another time.   
What is of significance is that this pattern of sanctions’ voting behavior clearly violated the intent 
of the WTO and quite possibly the actual agreements. Many of the states sanctioned are not yet 
members of the WTO (i.e. Syria, Iran, Libya, Sudan, North Korea), but Burma is. In the case of 
Burma, the stated goal of the sanction was to change the regime, which the literature indicates will 
have the lowest probability of success. In addition, the Burmese sanction included an import ban, 
which shows strong correlation in the data to voting based on industry density. While many 
countries may be the target of sanctions for protectionist reasons, Burma is one of the few that, 
based on its accession to the WTO and this analysis, might have standing to make a case to the 
WTO. As mentioned in the introduction, the WTO does allow sanctions for emergency purposes; 
however, looking at the general results of this analysis and the specifics of the Burmese sanctions, 
there are clear indications that the Burma sanctions are more likely protectionist measures rather 
than emergency measures. Which means Burma may be entitled to compensation for sanctions 
related damages.   
There are a variety of ways the U.S. can signal its stance on political issues within another country, 
and sanctions are one of the ways to create this signal. Unfortunately, strategic signals in the form 
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of sanctions may violate the rules of the WTO and therefore should be considered carefully prior 








Greenhouse gases, such as CO2, contribute to the warming effect climatologists have observed 
over the past few decades, and this warming has significant and negative implications on the future 
of the globe and its population. Therefore, CO2 emissions should be of major concern to the policy-
makers of every country. Unfortunately, and without exception, current literature on climate policy 
finds that the market outcome for CO2 abatement is less than the socially optimal outcome. This 
is the result of the inadequate employment of non-market forces to reduce the global emissions of 
CO2. (There are of course, many local policies that are aimed at reducing pollution, but few global 
ones.)  
Pollution in general, and CO2 in particular, reflects the tragedy of the commons. Where property 
rights cannot be clearly assigned, there is a strong incentive to free-ride on abatement. In such a 
context a single government can’t take action on a global scale and global action is required to 
tackle this global problem. Global abatement could reach its optimum level if either, a few big 
countries reduced their emissions to the optimal level then imposed sanction on other countries 
that did not reduce emissions as in Nordhaus (2015), or if a large number of small countries reduce 
their emissions and imposed sanctions on the larger countries.  But neither of these paths to optimal 
global abatement have been taken. Directly following the Paris Agreement, it seemed as though 
global action would finally become a reality, but over the recent months, the likelihood of 
adherence has decreased.   
As will be discussed in the next section, one option for an effective global climate policy requires 
a climate club, (Nordhaus, 2015); however, there is no clear path to get from the situation we are 
currently in, where no country is abating carbon at the socially optimal level, to a point where 
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countries are willing to impose sanctions on other countries (and suffer the consequences of such 
a political gesture) because of the pollution they create.  
The global pollution issues likely persist because consumers are in a situation where they 
immediately realize the abatement cost (a carbon tax, for example), but only indirectly benefit 
from abatement (and the benefit is not well understood). Understanding the benefits of carbon 
abatement is the key issue this paper will address. This paper will add to the current climate policy 
literature by looking at the recommendation proposed by Nordhaus (2015) to determine how and 
when the necessary condition for implementing environmental sanctions would be met. As such, 
the analysis in this paper will assume that enacting sanctions is political, voted on by consumers, 
and not something done by either a profit-maximizing firm or a planner. This can be done by 
altering an assumption made by Nordhaus (2015) while using the same underlying model. The 
major contribution this paper will make will be to introduce the assumption that the carbon damage 
coefficient is affected by an awareness function that directly contributes to the country’s awareness 
of abatement’s benefit.  
In addition, because the carbon damage function is not realized by any firm (or country), the 
political choice environmental-sanctions approach adds realism to the climate literature and will 
help to focus attention on the political change rather than simply looking at country-level welfare-
maximization.  
This paper is arranged as follow: section 2.2 will discuss the recent literature on climate policy; in 
section 2.3, I will construct a theoretical model that incorporates an awareness function; in section 
2.4, I will document the data used to calibrate model and solve the model; and in section 2.5, I will 
conclude and offer policy recommendations.  
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2.2. Current literature 
 
There is a rich body of economic literature on the topic of climate policy. As this paper is primarily 
looking at the Nordhaus (2015) model, the DICE model is a good place to begin as this is the basis 
for much of Nordhaus’ climate research.   
The DICE (Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy) Model and its regional equivalent, the RICE 
(Regional Integrated Climate-Economy) Model, show how an optimizing social planner would 
respond to the environmental damages inflicted by the emissions of CO2 (Nordhaus, 1999). This 
model uses a Ramsey optimal control framework that focuses on the trade-offs between abatement 
costs and the damage costs of CO2 using a discount rate, a Cobb-Douglas production function, 
and Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) welfare function. Welfare is diminished through the 
effects of climate change, while production is curtailed because of abatement. The model is 
parameterized using global estimates and gives the optimal solution based on the social 
discounting rate, carbon damages, and carbon abatement costs. The policy implication from this 
model is that a social planner would account for the total cost of production (including pollution), 
while the individual producer does not. The issue is that even in control-type economies, pollution 
is above its socially optimal level. Which points to some problems with the model’s framework.  
There is research that suggests that even without a social planner, some of the costs of pollution 
can be included in the production optimization decision. Peters and Romi (2013) looked at 
sanctions imposed on companies by the EPA and whether the companies complied with the 
mandatory SEC disclosure requirements.  Their analysis looks at the reputational effects of non-
compliance with environmental regulations, and assessed the effects that reputation alone has on 
complying with environmental standards. Karpoff, Lott, and Wehrly (2005) add to the Peters and 
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Romi (2013) research by empirically assessing the reputational effects that environmental 
violations have on firms. Karpoff, Lott, and Wehrly (2005) posit that firms comply with 
environmental standards because of the cost of fines and legal fees associated with non-
compliance. They show that market forces can be used to curtail environmental abuse. 
Unfortunately, the authors find that the optimal behavior, from the firms’ point of view, results in 
less pollution abatement than is socially optimal.  
Karp and Rezai (2015) show that current economic models do not account for how climate policy 
would affect the future price of capital. They suggest there is an increase in the future value of 
capital as a result of carbon abatement. To get to this result, the authors use an overlapping-
generations model instead of the infinitely lived agent model used in the previous papers, and 
endogenize capital prices by including buyers and sellers of capital within the framework. The 
Karp and Rezai (2015) model is then used to assess the incentives of the two generations on carbon 
abatement. Unlike the other models referenced in the literature, the authors find that when capital 
price is linked to the level of carbon abatement, there is an incentive for both generations to abate 
carbon. This is an important result because it finds reasons for carbon abatement other than 
altruism and bequest motives.  
While Karp and Rezai (2015) draw a link between production costs and climate change, the 
implied cost increase does not approximate the social cost of carbon, it is much lower. There are 
some cost of carbon that could be considered in a production optimization decision; however, there 




The previous models suggest that market forces are inadequate to price carbon at the rate that is 
socially optimal. One potential solution is government intervention on a global scale. For this, we 
can look to Barrett (1994) for his contribution on International Environmental Agreements (IEA). 
Barrett (1994) is a game theory analysis of self-enforcing IEA. The basic assumption is that 
countries contribute to global pollution abatement until they have maximized benefit (i.e. some 
pollution costs are realized at the country-level), which means that countries will reduce abatement 
if other countries withdraw from the agreement or reduce their abatement level. The presumption 
is that countries benefit more from additional abatement, but the marginal costs are increasing and 
the marginal benefits are decreasing. The Barrett (1994) model for the IEA is set up as follows: 
= − 2 ,     = …  ;  = �2 ;  = ∑ ; � = − ;  Π =∑ �     (2.1) 
Where = …  represents  identical countries;  is the benefit country  receives from 
abatement;  and  are coefficients (assumed to be positive);  is the global abatement;  is the 
abatement from country ; and  is the abatement cost for country . 
The cooperative outcome is found by maximizing Π. Given this setup, each country will choose 
an abatement level to maximize total welfare (equation 2.2). In the non-cooperative case, countries 
take the other countries’ abatement levels as given and, in good economic fashion, set their 
marginal benefit equal to their marginal cost (equation 2.3). This is less than the optimal level of 
abatement in the non-cooperative case.  
Cooperative:  = +    ,       = + .   (2.2) 
Non-Cooperative:  = +    ,       = +   ( 2.3) 
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Where the subscripts c and n denote the cooperative and non-cooperative cases respectively. 
With an IEA, there is some proportion of the countries that will sign the agreement, denoted as , which gives  participatents. Assuming all non-signatories are identical, their abatement level 
equals, 
 = −  .   
with a reaction function,  
, = −� − �+ −�   . .  
Given this reaction function, the signatories choose the optimal 
 , ∗ = −� + −�[ + −� 2+ 2� ]   .  .  
When  equals 1 or 0 we get the fully cooperative and non-cooperative case. Barrett focuses on 
finding the size of  that makes an IEA self-enforcing. In other words, at what point is there more 
benefit in cooperation than defection:   
� ≥ � +    (2.7). 
In the simple numerical exercise, Barrett (1994) showed that when N=10, the IEA will only be 
self-enforcing when = . , or when four countries are signatories to the agreement. When more 
countries than this are part of the agreement, individual countries can do better by not being a part 
of the agreement; while, when there are fewer, a country could do better by being a part of the 
agreement. This is the case even though the total benefit is maximized when all countries are part 
of the agreement.  
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Simulations further illustrate that the ∗ increases as  decreases. This is an intuitive result: if the 
cost is high, few people will want to pay it and if possible, countries will free-ride.  
After illustrating the possible outcomes with this simple model, Barrett (1994) continues with this 
model using differing cost and benefit functions: constant marginal cost and log marginal benefit.  
= � [ − � ln − � + �] ,   =  −� ln − �              (2.8) 
Where  is the emissions level absent abatement and  � is the percentage abatement.  This is 
similar to the Nordhaus (1990a) CO2 model, except that this model allows for differences in 
abatement level between countries. In this case, the number of countries for the IEA to be self-
enforcing is two, assuming there are at least two countries party to the agreement. Barrett (1994) 
also discusses the outcome in an infinitely repeated game. The problem, as the author pointed out, 
is that the IEA can be renegotiated at any point. So, no matter how small the discount factor, there 
is always an option to avoid future punishment by simply signing up to the IEA. This being the 
case, the punishment for non-cooperative behavior is negligible.  
To deal with these issues, Barrett (1994) relies on the Farrell and Maskin (1989) conclusion about 
when a payoff vector is “renegotiation proof.” In this case, the costs are the only necessary 
condition for the IEA to be self-enforcing, the critical factor in this model is the number of 
countries: 
 ̅ = min − , −     .  .  
Where  is the cost coefficient and ̅ is the maximum number of countries that can sustain the 
agreement. The number of countries in the agreement depends on the difference between the total 
cooperative profits and the total non-cooperative profits.  
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From the above it is clear that non-cooperative behavior will be the outcome when the cost are 
high, the potential profits are high, or when the number of countries are high. In other words, it is 
unlikely that a group of countries will organize to abate pollution until it is at the global optimum.  
Because international collective action is necessary, and countries will likely not engage in the 
optimal abatement without some motivation, as demonstrated in the previous papers, we can see 
that international action with punitive sanctions on the non-compliant might be the best option.  
Irfanoglu and Sesmero (2011) show that there is a prisoners’ dilemma with carbon abatement. 
They find that if either China or the U.S. reduce carbon emission and encourage other countries to 
abate carbon using a 9% tariff, then climate abatement would not suffer from the free-rider 
problem. The examples Irfanoglu and Sesmero (2011) used is the forestry and agricultural industry 
as a backdrop for the analysis (these two industries contribute to one third of the greenhouse gas 
emissions).   
Barrett (1997) presents a theoretical investigation on public goods and international trade. In this 
paper, Barrett concludes that there needs to be a credible threat of sanctions by a sufficiently large 
group in order for the public good to be supplied at an optimal level. In equilibrium, the sanctions 
will not be imposed and the public good will be supplied at the socially optimal point (i.e. the clean 
environment will be supplied at an optimal point).  
Nordhaus (2015) builds upon this literature and argues that sanctions are a necessary condition for 
a stable abatement policy and free-riding is an issue because of the Westphalian agreement where 
all countries are equal and free to manage their internal affairs as they see fit. Nordhaus (2015) 
begins by setting up a one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma game. In this case, the emissions control rates 
are the Herfindahl index times the optimal control rates. The Herfindahl index is based on GDP 
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and as Nordhaus (2015) pointed out, if there are 10 equally sized countries, then the HI = 10%. 
Thus, the emissions control rates would be 10% of the optimal amount. Because the countries can 
join and leave the club at will, a repeated decision game is a better reflection of the situation. At 
issue, is the creation of a renegotiation-proof international climate treaty. Nordhaus (2015) 
discusses the small coalition paradox, the paradox is alluded to by Barrett (1994), where it is shown 
that a coalition is only stable if it is small, and Nordhaus adds, shallow. Nordhaus points out that 
expanding some of the more effective climate treaties would be ineffective because of this paradox. 
There is an example in his paper of a world with 10 identical countries. In this case, they will form 
coalitions of two countries each; they will be stable and the global cost of carbon will be twice that 
of the non-cooperative equilibrium. The issue however, is even at this level the carbon price will 
be 1/5 the efficient level. So, bottom up coalitions perform better than no coalition, but not by 
much.  
The result of a bottom-up coalition is that without penalties on non-participants, we will end up 
with the results described above. However, imposing an import tariff based on the carbon content 
of the import is difficult to implement, because a lot of countries emit their carbon from internal 
consumption and it is not necessarily contained with the export goods. In the case of the U.S., the 
majority of the emissions come from the production of electricity, and where this electricity is 
consumed is a matter of debate. Nordhaus recommends a much simpler approach, uniform tariffs.  
This recommendation is based on a country-level welfare maximization model using the one-shot 
prisoners’ dilemma approach: 
� = − −   (2.10) 
48 
 
Where �  is the total welfare of country ; is quantity of goods consumed;  is the carbon 
abatement cost; and  is the damage caused by CO2.  
This is broken down a bit further, 
� = − − =  � − � � − � ( + ∑ ≠  )  (2.11) 
which includes country coefficients so as to be modeled at a global level. The �   is the country 
share coefficient for world consumption, . Abatement cost, � are a function of consumption, 
and damages as a function of total emissions (  is a positive coefficient and  is the country’s 
share of emissions, which are the damages), and  is the social cost of carbon. Nordhaus (2015) 
showed that with this type of model, a uniform tariff would be sufficient to lower emissions to the 
target level. This type of tariff is primarily designed to increase participation in the club. While the 
sanctions are at the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) level, the sender (or rather the consumers in the 
sender’s country) are immediately hurt by an increase in the cost of imports, the benefits they 
receive take much longer to realize (and may not actually be realized by the people who are hurt). 
Using the Integrated Assessment Models (IAM), the models used to assess the effects of CO2, and 
the DICE-RICE model, the SCC is country specific and is determined by using the national GDP.  
Using the appendix in Nordhaus (2015) to describe the model in more detail, we find that the 
model used for his conclusions is specified as follows:  
� = − �     $  � �∗�� − ∑ − ∑       (2.12) 
In this model,  is trade efficiency multiplied by the country’s terms of trade, which is a 
relative measure of gains from trade; is the emissions prior to the climate club; and  is the 
emissions after the climate club. There are 14 countries in the model and the rest-of-world. To 
49 
 
solve this, various SCC and tariff rates are iterated through to find a Pareto Improving combination 
for all countries.  
The interesting part of this model is that rather than a general equilibrium model, which would be 
expected when modelling global trade, it is a utility maximization model where trade is the benefit, 
and pollution and abatement are the costs. Thus, the country-level abatement is relatively easy to 
solve for. In addition, the point at which the country will decide if there is more benefit to joining 
the climate club or remaining outside of the club and paying the carbon tariff is equally apparent.  
Nordhaus (2015) found that countries do not join the climate club if sanctions are not a part of the 
club; the higher the target price for carbon, the lower the participation, and/or the higher the tariff 
needed to induce participation. There is a Laffer type curve, with the global price of carbon, when 
the target price moves from $50 to $100. In this situation, countries tend to accept the tariff instead 
of increase the price of carbon.  
Motivation for additional research 
Building upon previous analysis and drawing largely on Nordhaus (2015), this paper will: 
1. Construct a country level model for welfare from pollution as a function of production 
2. Assess damages as an increase in the cost of goods and pollution levels (rather than the 
SCC, because price is obvious to consumers while SCC may not be) 
3. Model the impact of pollution “awareness” on pollution and welfare 
 
The third point is the core contribution of this paper. The idea is that consumers must experience 
some decrease in welfare from the production of pollution in order for a country to switch from 
the current consumption mix to a less pollutive consumption mix. In the Nordhaus (2015) model 
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the implication is that current benefit from trade is greater than the social cost of CO2. In an effort 
to increase the social cost of CO2, a tariff is levied, which will decrease overall welfare. 
Unfortunately, it seems as though there is a step missing: the step where a country willingly levies 
a reasonable CO2 tax. When looking at the welfare model (equation 2.12) it is clear that a country 
would be better off it does not levy a tax. And this is the observed outcome.  
For a country to consider taxing CO2 at the optimal level, there has to be some change in the 
awareness about the issue; or rather, welfare must be negatively affected by the knowledge of how 
consumption is adding to the pollution problem. When this occurs, a tax equal to the decrease in 
welfare could be implemented.   
In the social marketing discipline, there is a rich body of literature that discusses the impact 
marketing has on influencing people into socially optimal behavior. Thaler and Sunstein (2003), 
discussed the effects of small messaging/marketing adjustments on the observed behavior of 
consumers. In Thaler, Sunstein, and Balz (2014), the authors discuss specifically how small 
changes in public policy (i.e. marketing better choices) will lead to large changes public welfare. 
Other research has discussed similar, yet more specific cases. Peattie and Peattie (2008) found that 
an increase in social marketing led to an overall reduction in consumption. And in the U.S., 
overconsumption is the primary issue. Consumers are purchasing too many wasteful products, 
which is contributing to both pollution from the production of the goods but also pollution from 
the disposal of the goods. Also, related directly to the CO2 issue, McNamara and Grubb (2011) 
looked at consumer energy use. They found that with only slight changes to energy marketing, 
consumption would decrease by significant amount.  




Now, fusing the Nordhaus (2015) climate club model with the notion that countries are comprised 
of consumer/voters who would have to elect politicians to enact environmental sanctions, I will 
develop a model that looks at the conditions under which environmental sanction are a viable way 
to reduce emissions. In this case viability is assessed by focusing on consumer behavior. If for 
example, consumers were willing to forego some consumption to consume products that contain 
less pollution, then consumers would also be willing to forego some imports for the greater good. 
When this occurs, sanctions would be a viable political option.  
2.3. Model and Theoretical Basis 
 
Building upon the Nordhaus (2015) model, this paper will look at how changes in preferences over 
time will affect the desire for cleaner/less consumption and the welfare from environmental 
sanctions when consumers prefer consumption that is less carbon intensive. The model for this 
paper will be a two-good model where the global pollution and consumption are examined. These 
goods are perfect substitutes: one good is relatively expensive yet cleaner, while the other good is 
cheap and results in high pollution. This two-good, two-country model can be thought of as U.S. 
and China model, or as a more general framework for an individual country and the rest of world.  
To begin, the within country model will only include a country’s welfare from goods and pollution:  
� , = −    (2.13) 
where similar to Nordhaus (2015),  is quantity consumed,  is emissions, and  and  are 
coefficients representing the benefit from consumption and the damage from emissions, 
respectively.   
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Positive welfare comes from consuming and negative welfare comes from pollution. Pollution 
is a function of producing the consumption goods: 
=     (2.14) 
 Assuming log welfare from consumption, we get a simple welfare expression: 
� = ln −      (2.15) 
This simple welfare model can then be extended to include the expensive and cheap goods and 
exports: 
� = . ln + ln  − −     (2.16) 
Where the subscript  represents imports, the subscript  represents goods produced locally, and 
 is a positive scaler that represents the consumers’ preference for pollution in a foreign rather 
than domestic market. Keeping with the Nordhaus (2015) model, this model will be a utility 
maximization model where there are benefits from trade and cost from the production of CO2.  
By definition, the imports will create more pollution, yet cost less. This assumption is based on 
two things. First, on average, Chinese imports cost American consumers roughly 70% of what that 
same good would cost if it was produced in the U.S. (Nash-Hoff, 2011), which is the rationale for 
the coefficient on the welfare from the domestic good. Second, as can be seen in figure 2.2, China 
produces more pollution per dollar of GDP than the U.S. does.  
This model is functionally equivalent to the Nordhaus (2015) model. The primary difference is 
that abatement costs are implicit in the cost differences between the imports and domestically 
produced goods and the terms of trade are explicit in the equation.  While the equation in this paper 
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is functionally the same, shifting away from the Nordhaus (2015), the coefficients in this model 
have distinct interpretations and the coefficients also change over time.  
The rationale for the evolution over time instead of simply using the one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma, 
is that the voters, whose welfare is affected by the equation, vote based on a changing political 
environment. As a side note, even though this will be modelled in time (in the next section), the 
Bellman equation does not apply as this doesn’t assume future discounting, (Adda and Cooper, 
2003).  
There will be two parts to solving this welfare model, the first will find the complete welfare 
function that solves for the level of consumption given the max-welfare from pollution and the 
second will be a model where max-welfare from pollution is the state variable and pollution 
awareness is the control. This second equation will be the awareness function. The awareness 
functions will model the perception of pollution as an issue, or put another way, it will model 
people awareness of the pollution problem such that this awareness adversely affects welfare when 
pollution is produced. When awareness increases the max-welfare from pollution decreases. This 
awareness function will be increased to the point where people will trade consumption for less 
pollution. When this tipping point is reached, the consumer/voter would, at that point, be willing 
to vote for legislators who are in favor of climate clubs as described in Nordhaus (2015).  
Modifying equation 2.15 slightly for a model that evolves over time, domestic welfare 
maximization changes to: 
� = . ln + ln  − −          (2.17) 
= ℎ      (2.18) 
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= ∑ +−    (2.19) 
Where a subscript � has been added to indicate time � = …  , ℎ is a pollution awareness control 
variable that directly affects the pollution welfare coefficients and  is the total level of pollution.  
In this model, there are two state variables ( ,  and three control variables ( , ,  ℎ). 
The pollution awareness control variable represents the effort applied to social marketing. Simply 
put, governments and non-profits encourage people to pollute less by raising awareness about the 
effects of pollution. One example of this is that new car window stickers now list the amount of 
CO2 produced by the vehicle in a year. This sticker is a simple tool used to help consumers 
understand the impact their purchases have on the environment. This type of awareness campaign 
has costs and associated environmental benefits. This cost/benefit function is described where ℎ  in equation 2.17 is the benefit and ℎ is the cost, and in this model, ℎ is also the pollution 
awareness control.  
2.4. Model Calibration 
 
To calibrate the pollution production function, I used the U.S. for the domestic good and China for 
the import. For both countries, GDP has grown over time. In recent years, we have seen a reduction 
in the amount of CO2 required to produce a dollar of GDP in the U.S., while in China there has 




FIGURE 2.5 - U.S. CO2 PER $ OF GDP. SOURCE: WORLDS DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 
 
FIGURE 2.6 - CHINA CO2 PER $ OF GDP. SOURCE: WORLDS DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 
 
These data in figure 2.1 and 2.2 are from the WDI and consist of the 1960-2013 data series using 
CO2 emissions (kt) and GDP (USD). 
These data points give the following specifications for the U.S. (the � subscript was dropped for 



























































= .        (2.20) 
= .         (2.21) 
The pollution functions for the domestic and import goods (equations 2.20 and 2.21) were 
estimated by fitting a linear function to the data in figure 2.1 and 2.2.  
� = ln + . ln − ( .  + . )    (2.22) 
While we cannot observe �, we can assume that the observed choice of  maximizes this 
equation.  
��� � : = �. ;    ��� : = . �.      (2.23) 
Using this assumption, we can calculate the coefficients using the following two equations: 
= �. �    (2.24) 
=  . .     (2.25) 
From import and export data8, setting =  and solving for  and  we get: 
= . ; = .    (2.26) 
Import and export data (  and  ) consist of U.S. imports as a percent of GDP and U.S. exports 
as a percent of GDP. This data is a proxy for the preference ratio of consumers for local production 
versus imports. According to Shui and Harriss (2004), this is a reasonable assumption as generally 




the U.S. exports relatively low-pollution goods while the U.S. imports relatively high-pollution 
goods.  
For the numerical model,  will simply be used as a starting value, while  and  will be treated 
as constants.  
2.5. Pollution Awareness Function 
 
Finding numbers to generate a pollution awareness function is problematic. The social marketing 
literature is rife with behavioral change data, but finding cost data proved difficult. While good 
numbers are elusive, simple illustrations of the point come from the “Don’t Mess With Texas” 
campaign and the patient adherence literature in the medical profession.  
 
FIGURE 2.7 - TEXAS POLLUTION REDUCTION AND AWARENESS EXPENDITURE 
The “Don’t Mess With Texas” campaign is a Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) 
funded anti-littering advertising. Data from this campaign was collected from 2001 to 2013 once 
about every four years with the amount of litter cataloged. I’ve taken these numbers and adjusted 





















analysis suffers from a lack of data (among other things), but with the given data I’ve generated 
the very broad approximation below: 
ln =  − . ln ℎ      (2.27) 
 
Another section of the economy that demonstrates a similar type of function is patient adherence 
in the medical profession. Patient adherence describes the amount to which patients follow their 
doctors’ advice. In most cases, patient adherence refers to how well a patient follows their 
medication regimen, but it can more broadly apply to diet, exercise and physical therapy 
recommendations. Patient adherence and personal choice in pollution are similar because in both 
cases, there is a recommendation that is in the best long-term interest of the individual, yet in both 
cases the recommendation may not be followed due to short-term considerations. There are also 
many variables that affect patient adherence, including cost of adherence (drug cost, therapy cost, 
etc.), ease of adherence (number of dosages per day, physical requirements, etc.), and, most 
relevant to this paper, money spent by the healthcare provider on ensuring adherence.  
Doctors and hospitals affect adherence by spending money on personal consultation, electronic 
reminders, and, based on Volpp et al. (2008), sometime money is given directly to patients for 
compliance. 
In Volpp et al. (2008), while the main research focus was on whether financial incentives increase 
patient adherence, there were multiple methods employed by the research group. The study had to 
actively track the patients’ dosages which necessitated a comprehensive application of patient 
adherence methods.  They found a significant increase in the number of correct dosages based on 
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the amount of money spent on compliance. This is the normal result found in patient adherence 
literature; however, unlike other literature, Volpp et al. (2008) track the monetary component.  
 
FIGURE 2.8 - CHART REPLICATED FROM VOLPP ET AL. (2008) 
Comparing the Volpp et al. (2008) analysis to the TxDOT  data, we can see a similar log function: 
Volpp (2008): = . − . ℎ     (2.28) 
TxDOT: ln = ln . − . ℎ     (2.29) 
While the y-axis on the patient adherence graph and the TxDOT graph are clearly not the same, 
they are both related to the trade-off between short-term and long-term benefit. As there isn’t 
enough data in either study for use in empirical estimates, the studies simply illustrate the shape 
of the awareness curve, from which I can generate an estimate knowing there is a natural log 
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Putting all these parameter estimates together with a model similar to Nordhaus (2015) we get the 
following equations:  
� = . . ln + ln  − . − .  .         (2.30) 
= . ln ℎ √      (2.31) 
= ∑ . + .−    (2.32) 
Finally, using these equations and solving for the optimum at differing awareness levels, I have 
generated a graph that depicts how awareness would shift consumption from pollutive imports to 
cleaner domestic goods: 
 
FIGURE 2.9 - TIPPING POINT FOR SANCTIONS 
In figure 2.5 and 2.6 the y-axis values are arbitrary units.   
The lines in figure 2.5 represent the welfare functions, one where all consumption is the domestic 
good and the other where there is a mix of imports and domestic consumption. Initially, consumers 
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increases (on the x-axis), keeping everything else static, there is a point where consumers would 
be better off by only purchasing the cleaner and less polluting good and consume from 100% 
domestic production. At this transition point, awareness has shifted the consumers’/voters’ 
preferences to the point where they would benefit from having an environmental sanction imposed 
on the polluting import partner. 
The next graph (figure 2.6) shows this model compared to the Nordhaus (2015) model where the 
SCC is set to $12.5, the country is the U.S., and the tariff rate is constant at 5%. At the intersection 
of the lines, a country would be indifferent between joining a climate club where sanctions are 
imposed on violating countries and consuming the current mix of goods.   
 
FIGURE 2.10 – WELFARE AT LOW SCC LEVEL AND WITH POLLUTION AWARENESS 
 
The lighter line represents the country’s welfare given the minimum SCC level and an average 
tariff rate. The welfare is a horizontal line in the graph because it is solved for a single level with 
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does not include the awareness functions, which is why it does not vary with changes in the x-
value. The 5% tariff rate was used because it is the middle of the road estimate for what is required 
to maintain a climate club without free-riders (Nordhaus, 2015). The SCC level was used because 
it is the lowest number used in Nordhaus (2015), which makes it easiest to achieve.  
Given these numbers, Nordhaus (2015) finds that a climate club will not suffer from the free rider 
problem. However, as can be seen from the first points on the two curves, the current welfare from 
trade in the U.S., which is the first point on the darker line in figure 2.10 (Welfare from Foreign 
and Domestic Consumption), is significantly higher than welfare when a carbon tax and tariff is 
imposed, which is the lighter line in figure 2.10 (Nordhaus (2015) Welfare at $12.5 SCC and Tariff 
rate of 5%). In terms of country-level welfare, there would need to be a large increase in pollution 
awareness before welfare reaches the point where a country would be better off in a climate club 
as described in Nordhaus (2015). Fortunately, with effort applied to social marketing to increase 
pollution awareness, it could be possible to reach the point where sanctions do not decrease a 
county’s welfare and a climate club could become a reality.  
2.6. Implication and Recommendations 
 
The interesting implication of this analysis is that while CO2 abatement could be achieved through 
a climate club, as described by Nordhaus (2015), the politicians who would implement such a 
scheme would need to be elected by a willing populace. As the graphs show (figure 2.5 and figure 
2.6), if the U.S. implemented the carbon tax and environmental sanctions as described in Nordhaus 
(2015) there would be a significant decrease in the country’s welfare. As such, it is unlikely that 
taxes and sanctions will be implemented. On the other hand, if the U.S. only pursues social 
marketing, the expenditure on marketing will likely be cost prohibitive. However, if social 
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marketing is pursued until the transition point identified in figure 2.6, it is likely that expenditures 
will remain at a socially acceptable level and sanctions could become viable.  At this point the 
population would be willing to pay more for less pollution, and might also be willing to elect 
representatives who would impose sanctions on countries for non-compliance.  This suggests that 
in addition to focusing on environmental lobbying efforts, as would be required for a climate club 
to become a reality, effort should also be applied to social marketing efforts to raise awareness 
about the detrimental impact of pollution.  
The model in this paper is different than others found in recent literature in that it focuses on short-
term behavior rather than infinitely lived agents, overlapping generations, or one-shot games. I 
believe this type of model is more realistic and can help countries find the correct policy levers to 
focus on and thereby reduce pollution to its optimal level.  
There are many small-scale efforts within the U.S. where social marketing is employed to 
encourage beneficial behavior, from nudging people to make more informed eating decisions to 
suggesting that recycling should be routine. At issue, however, is that these campaigns are small 
in scale or small in scope and don’t address the issue of global pollution. The U.S. funds a 
significant amount of environmental research through the EPA and other agencies9 but they don’t 
spend enough on pollution awareness for it to even receive its own line item in any agency’s 
budget. This paper shows that national level expenditures on pollution awareness might be 
justified, and could lead to consumers/voters who receives more benefit from expensive and 
cleaner product, than they receive from additional consumption. This benefit could then translate 





into a political institution that is willing to issue environmental sanctions, and these sanctions could 






This paper will address the question of how countries are affected by sanctions. Using data on U.S. 
imposed sanctions from 1990 to 2015 and time-series forecasting, this paper will analyze how 
countries are affected, in general, after a sanction is imposed. From employing the time-series 
forecasting method, it will be clear which indicators are above or below expectation and for which 
country types. Other literature performs similar analysis using the case study method, lag variables 
and regressions. For example, Escriba-Folch and Wright (2010) employed a one-year lag to assess 
the changes in country-level indicators, Hufbauer et al. (2007) used regression analysis to assess 
effectiveness, and Levy (1999) employed the case study approach. This paper will rely on time 
series analysis because of the difficultly involved in fully identifying these types of models.  
This paper adds to the literature in in two unique ways: it uses recent data to confirm and challenge 
previous analysis, and uses a broad data set with a novel analytic approach.  
While Hufbauer et al. (2007) used a sizable data set, most other papers on the topic focus their 
efforts on a handful of sanctions episodes. This paper will look at 30 sanctions episodes across 14 
countries. Using this data, this paper challenges Hufbauer et al. (2007); Escriba-Folch (2012); and 
Marinov (2005) who have all found that sanctions are more effective against democracies than 
other forms of government. This paper finds that constrained democracies (political systems that 
are in between democracies and dictatorships) are affected more by sanctions than pure 
democracies. This paper confirms the findings of Peksen (2009) who found that the poor often 
suffer when sanctions are implemented. This paper also confirms the findings in a variety of studies 
including Hufbauer et al. (2007), where the authors posit that harsher sanctions are more effective 
than more measured sanctions.  
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In addition, this paper finds that countries that are the target of sanction with a realatively large 
GDP are able to aquire above average development assistance, which implies that sanctions may 
cost the sender country more than anticipated; target countries with a higher percentage of GDP 
from exports spend more on military after sanctions are imposed, which implies that sanction are 
not a good military impairment strategy for export-based economies; and people in the labor force 
fair better under dictatorships than under other political systems after sanctions are imposed, which 
implies that sanctioning a dictator for human rights issues might be effective, while sanctioning 
other political system may not achieve the desired result.  
This paper is set up as follows: section 3.2 will discuss the relevant literature; section 3.3 will 
contain a discussion of the analytic method; section 3.4 will be an explanation of the data; section 
3.5 will detail the results; and section 3.6 will be the conclusion. 
3.2. Literature 
 
One of the key aspects of economic sanctions are that they cause some damage to the target 
country’s economy and in general, for sanction to achieve its stated goal, the damage inflicted on 
a country should be more severe than the cost of non-compliance. There is a wide range of 
literature that discusses the potential impacts sanctions will have on an economy, and costs are 
discussed in Eaton and Engers (1999) where they look at the conditions under which a target 
country will comply and the conditions under which the country will continue with its current 
policies. These authors look at both the political cost as well as the economic cost; however, this 
paper will focus specifically on the economics costs.  
Damages will follow any sanction, and these damages will come in the form of reduced 
government revenue, increased prices for goods and services, and/or a general reduction in the 
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target country’s welfare. These outcomes come about through three broad types of sanctions: 
restrictions on investment, restrictions on export, and restrictions on import (or some combination 
of these three).  Sanctions that prohibit foreign direct investment are intended to slow the target’s 
growth in either a specific sector or throughout the entire economy. This reduction in growth will 
lead to a reduction in both incomes and in government revenue. Dalmazzo and Marini (2000) show 
that the threat of sanctions is a viable method to ensure property rights (e.g. nations will not 
nationalize foreign investments because of the impact sanctions have on the nation’s economy and 
the government’s revenue) and by this notion, they draw a link between investment and 
government revenue.  
Sanctions that target exports in a country will reduce GDP and thereby cause a reduction in 
government revenue and revenue for producers/workers in the targeted industry. This reduction in 
producer/worker revenue is designed to inflict pain on the constituency of the politicians while the 
secondary effect of reducing government revenue will directly affect the people who could comply 
with the sending country’s demands. This sanction effect is illustrated in Escriba-Folch and Wright 
(2010) where they discuss the ability of dictators to extract rents which they disburse to the 
coalition that keeps them in power. Without these disbursements, dictators cannot maintain the 
partnerships required to maintain power.  
When sanctions disallow exports from the sending country to the target country, this could affect 
the target country’s economy in a variety of ways. If the import in the target country is subject to 
a tariff, prohibiting this import will directly reduce the target government’s revenue. If the sanction 
is a consumption good for which there is a readily available substitute, then the price of 
consumption in that country will increase by the amount of the difference between the price of the 
imported and domestically produced good (i.e. the price of the good will increase from the world 
68 
 
price to the autarky price). If the sanction is a necessity for which there is no readily available 
substitute, then the public welfare will decline sharply after the sanction and productivity will 
decrease across all sectors. This last effect is illustrated any time there is an embargo on oil and 
the research on this effect dates back to the oil embargoes in the mid-1970s. Levy (1999) chronicles 
the oil embargoes on South Africa to assess their impact on the anti-apartheid movement, and 
Hayes and Hudak (1987) discuss the welfare loss associated with the embargoes on oil imposed 
on the U.S. in 1973. In these cases, the good subject to sanction did not have a readily available 
substitute, and in both cases, there was a significant welfare reduction and a productivity decrease.  
There are other sanction types, sanctions on individuals in a foreign country for example, and these 
types of sanctions are not intended to inflict widespread damage on the target economy. In most 
cases these are part of a strategic message from the sender to the target which conveys the 
displeasure with the target country’s national policies. The sanctions examined in this research are 
sanctions that target goods, services, or finances (see appendix).  
Since it is these macro effects that contribute to the effectiveness of sanctions, it makes sense to 







Time-series analysis is used to identify the factors within the data that affect its movement. This 
type of analysis is appropriate with data on complex systems and with financial data. The economic 
indicators used in this analysis are a combination of financial and complex-system data, making 
time-series analysis the appropriate option. In general, time-series analysis is employed when there 
is not a good way to ensure all independent variables are included in a model. Considering this 
paper is looking at ten indicators across 30 sanctions episodes, time-series analysis is the only 
analytic option that is statistically valid.  
Every indicator in the analysis was modelled using an autoregressive integrated moving average 
(ARIMA) process. The ARIMA was picked because according to Brockwell and Davis (2003), it 
can deal with non-stationary data. ARIMA is very flexible as any of the autoregressive, trend, or 
moving average components can be omitted if it fits the data better.  
Using a best-fit approach each of the parameters in the ARIMA (p, d, q) was picked from a range 
of integers to find the best model for the data (p is the autoregressive component; d is the trend 
component; and q is the moving average component).  
The best ARIMA for each series was picked based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
The ARIMA with the smallest AIC is used. The AIC is: 
� =  − ln +            (3.1)   (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009) 




The time-series that was used to generate this ARIMA model included all data prior to the 
sanction’s episode. If for example, there was data from 1970 to 2015 for a given indicator and a 
sanction was imposed in 2006, then the data from 1970 through 2005 was fit to an ARIMA model. 
Then this ARIMA was used to predict the next five years of data. As is the case with most 
predictions, predictions using time-series analysis are less accurate the farther into the future they 
get. To account for this, a 95% confidence bound was added to each prediction that expanded as 
the time from the initial prediction increased.  
To determine whether there was a significant change in the indicator from before to after the 
sanction was imposed, the prediction with the confidence bound was compared to the actual data 
for the series. If the indicator significantly deviated from the prediction, it was then assumed there 
was some difference in the indicator from before to after the sanctions was implemented. Of 
course, because this is time series analysis and not a randomized controlled trial, a causal 
relationship between the sanction and the indicator cannot be established. However, with enough 
data sets and with enough countries, some generalities can be inferred concerning the changes in 
macro-level indicators after a sanction is implemented. 
This analysis will consist of a time series dataset and a best-fit ARIMA model. Using the ARIMA 
model, estimates for the macro-level indicators will generate estimates which will then be 
compared to the actual data to determine if the years after the sanction were significantly above or 
below its predicted level. With this, we can see if there is a significant change in the indicator after 
a sanction is implemented.  
While there are too many forecasts to look at in detail (300 in total), two of them will be discussed 
to illustrate the process: Burundi – Developed Middle Class, and Iran – Development Assistance. 
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Burundi was the target of sanction in 2015, as such, the entirety of the time series prior to 2015 
was used to develop a model (1990-2014). Then, beginning in 2015, that model was used to predict 
5 years into the future. As can be seen in figure 3.1, the actual data was significantly below the 
prediction for 2015 and 2016. Note that the shaded area represents the 95% confidence bound for 
the prediction. Also, as 2017 through 2020 have not been realized, the prediction is only used to 
compare the two years (2015 and 2016). The comparison indicates there is a significant decrease 
in the percentage of people employed in the middle class after the sanctions were implemented.  
 
 
FIGURE 3.11- BURUNDI 2015 SANCTION TIME SERIES 
To allow for comparisons across countries when some indicators have five data points after the 
beginning of the prediction and others have fewer, an index value is used. For this index value, 
when the total number of observations after the prediction are outside the confidence bound, a 
country-sanction pair will receive a five; if some but not all of the observations are outside of the 
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confidence bound, the country-sanctions pair will receive the appropriate fraction of five. In the 
Burundi case, the Developed Middle-Class indicator index would be negative 5.  
Next, we will look at Iran and the development assistance indicator in figure 3.2. Iran was 
sanctioned in 2009, and for this indicator, data exists from 1960 to 2015. For the time series model, 
data from 1960 through 2008 was used to generate a model, then beginning in 2009 that model 
was used to forecast five years out. We can see that while the predicted values were less than the 
actual value, all the actual values are within the gray 95% confidence bound. As such, this indicator 
would be considered to be within the predicted range for all five of the predicted years and no 
significant change would be reported. The country-sanction pair index would be zero for the Iran 
Development Assistance and this is because, based on the prediction, there was no impact on 
development assistance after the sanction was imposed on Iran.  
 
FIGURE 3.12 - IRAN 2009 SANCTION TIME SERIES 






Broad (as opposed to limited) sanctions target an entire economy. These types of sanctions include 
embargoes, import and export restrictions. With these types of economic measures, it is expected 
that the economic upheaval caused by the sanction is sufficient to affect a change in the target 
country’s policy. As such, it is reasonable to look at country-level data, as there should be some 
difference in these indicators after a sanction is implemented.  
Data for this analysis was taken from two places: The International Labor Organization, and The 
World Development Indicators database. 
The data was picked based on its completeness and its relevance to this analysis. There were ten 
indicators that were mostly complete for the 30 sanctions episodes.  
Household consumption expenditure data (from World Development Indicators) is the total 
value of goods and services purchased by households in a year. The data include all consumer 
purchases except houses, so it is a good measure for assessing consumer behavior after a sanction 
is implemented. If expenditures increase beyond the trend, that would indicate there is some cost 
borne upon the consumers in the target country after sanctions are implemented. This cost is likely 
in the form of increased uncertainty as households may increase consumption immediately after a 
sanction is implemented to hedge against the uncertainty of the sanction’s effect on future 
consumption.  
The government consumption indicator (from World Development Indicators) includes all 
government consumption and personnel cost (including payments to military personnel, excluding 
purchases of military capital equipment, and including public health expenditure). This indicator 
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will be used to assess how governments are affected after a sanction is implemented. If government 
consumption decreases after a sanction is implemented, then there is a chance that the government 
is bearing some of the burden from the sanction. 
Military expenditures as a percent of GDP (from World Development Indicators) is an 
important indicator to look at because many of the sanctions imposed by the U.S. have a stated 
goal of impairing the target country’s military capacity. While government consumption includes 
military expenditures, it does not include military capital expenditure. This can be a large 
proportion of the military budget, especially in times of military build-up. In addition, military 
expenses as a percent of GDP is a good measure to assess the relative increase or decrease in the 
size of a country’s military. If this indicator increases after a sanction, then there is less validity 
to an argument for sanctioning a country for military reasons.  
For the employment data, including the percentage of the labor force in the developed middle 
class, the percentage of the labor force that is extremely poor, unemployment, and the Labor 
Force Participation Rate (LFPR), the percentages are estimates from the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) and were either obtained directly from the ILO or from the ILO through the 
World Development Indicators database. The data for unemployment and LFPR are collected in 
a way that is consistent with the other data used in this analysis, the percentage of the labor force 
that is extremely poor and the percentage of the labor forces that is developed middle class and 
above was collected by the ILO using stratified survey sampling. In addition, the surveys for this 
data are generally not conducted on an annual basis, yet the data is produced on an annual basis. 
As such, the ILO uses interpolation techniques to generate the annual estimate. Because of this, 
there is a risk the time-series forecasting method employed in this analysis models the ILO’s 
interpolation method rather than the actual rates of employment. To mitigate this risk, the 
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employment data time-series forecasts were compared to the survey dates published by the ILO 
to ensure the employment data estimation methods were not the primary effect picked up by the 
ARIMA forecasting process.  
The percent of labor force that is extremely poor and the percent of labor force that is developed 
middle class and above (from the International Labor Organization), are used to look at both the 
humanitarian aspect of sanctions as well as the types of people who may want sanctions removed. 
If the country sanctioned is a democracy, for example, and the working middle class are worse off 
after a sanction, that is good for the sanction sender but bad for the politicians in the target country. 
Metrics for extremely poor and developed middle class are highly correlated between males and 
females for every country (the correlation coefficient for developed middle class and above is 0.98 
and the correlation coefficient for extremely poor is 1), and the International Labor Organization 
only published this data set by sex. Because of this, the metric female developed middle class and 
female extremely poor was use for this analysis. 
Unemployment and labor force participation rate (both from World Development Indicators 
via the ILO) are used to assess the general economic climate of the country.  
The development assistance received (from World Development Indicators) is a general 
estimate of money transferred from countries or other national agencies to countries on the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Development Assistance 
Committee’s (DAC) Official Development Assistance recipients list. This list consists of 
countries with a per capita Gross National Income (GNI) of less than about $13,000 (in 2013 
dollars). While most of the sanctioned countries are on this list, Russia’s GNI was too high to 
qualify for the list (and it is a member of the DAC), and therefore was not included in this part of 
the analysis.  
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Development assistance is a metric that will indicate one of the ways countries other than the target 
country may be affected by a sanction. If the U.S. imposed a sanction on a country and that country 
then gets substantially more development assistance after the sanction is imposed, then there may 
be a group of countries that are negatively affected by the sanctions. Meaning that while a given 
country is the target of the sanction, other ally countries may divert a portion of their national 
budget to helping the sanctioned country rather than some more productive (and more palatable) 
venture. This could be an unintended consequence for the U.S.   
Public health expenditure (from World Development Indicators) is the amount of healthcare 
funded by the government, while health expenditure per capita (from World Development 
Indicators) is the total amount of healthcare spending. Health expenditures are good metrics to 
look at because if public health expenditure decrease or health expenditure per capita increase 
while public health expenditure remain the same, which would be likely if government spending 
on social programs decreases after a sanction is imposed, then there is a good chance that the public 
revenue decrease is affecting the populace.  
Finally, the Polity Index from the Center for Systemic Peace is used to categorize the countries by 
government type. The Polity Index is used in section 3.4.2 to identify the differences in the effect 
of sanctions based on the type of political regime of the country.  
When the indicators used are monetary values (rather than percent), the values were converted to 
purchasing power parity10 (PPP) and then adjusted for inflation (using the WDI inflation estimate) 
for the entire time series.  
                                                          
10 The PPP estimate was taken from the World Bank’s 2011 estimate with two exceptions. The two 
exceptions to this were the Cuba and Somalia data. For these countries, the World Bank does not produce 










WDI  Inflation Adjusted PPP 
Government Consumption WDI  Inflation Adjusted PPP 
Military expenditure WDI  % GDP 
Extremely poor ILO  % Labor Force 
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ILO  % Labor Force 
Development assistance received WDI  Inflation Adjusted PPP 
Health expenditure, public WDI  % of total health 
expenditure 
Health expenditure per capita WDI  Inflation Adjusted PPP 
Unemployment WDI  % Labor Force 




There are 30 sanctions episodes and 10 indicators (300 total charts) as part of this analysis, which 
is too much to visually consume. Because of this, I developed an index to make the data easier to 
interpret.  
For this index, each indicator was normalized so that the total number of actual data values that 
could have been inside or outside the forecast was set to five. This range of forecasted years, the 
years after the sanction was implemented, will be referred to as the prediction window. As in the 
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case of the 2015 sanction against Burundi in figure 3.1, there were only two data points after the 
beginning of the sanction, and to make this comparable with other sanctions episodes, the 2 would 
map to an index value of 5. The 5 indicates the indicator was outside of the predicted bounds for 
the maximum number of years. Any time all of the actual data is significantly different from the 
prediction, the indicator/sanction episode pair will receive a 5, and when fewer than all the 
predicted years were significantly different from the actual data, the number of years was 
multiplied by the multiplier: 
[5/(number of years available within the prediction window)]    
In some cases, some of the indicators did not exist for some of the countries for some of the years. 
In these cases, the indicator for that country does not appear on the graph. 
The first year of prediction is generally the most accurate (Brockwell & Davis, 2003), and the first 
year after a sanction is implemented is generally the most disruptive for a country (Davis & 
Engerman, 2003). While more than one data point is preferred, if there is only one data point, the 
first point after the sanction is a good point for the assessment. Unfortunately, these results are not 
as robust as the results when all five points are present, which makes these results suggestive.  
3.5.1. Results by indicators 
The first set of results are for each indicator for every sanctions episode. 
Note that some countries were sanctioned more than once. All the data is shown on the chart for 
completeness; however, in the next section where countries are broken up by type, a country is 
only used more than once if the sanction episodes are more than five years apart. This prevents 




3.5.2. Household Consumption 
The graph in figure 3.3 shows all sanctions episodes for household consumption expenditure 
indicator. The y-axis on the graph is the index that loosely maps to the number of years the 
indicator value was above (below) the predicted value. A zero indicates the indicator was within 
the predicted range for the entire prediction window. In general, this chart indicates that household 
consumption expenditures, were on average, high after a sanction for 1.08 years. Or to look at 
another way, consumers paid more for consumer goods for about a year after sanctions were 
implemented than would have been expected based on prior consumption expenditures. This 
implies that consumer changed their spending pattern after a sanction was imposed on their country 
which is a good indicator that the sanctions had an effect on consumers.   
  
FIGURE 3.13 - HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE 
3.5.3. Government Consumption 
Government consumption, in figure 3.4, averages out to about 1.24. While there are some below 
the line and some above the line, the average is a little above one, which implies that in general, 














goal of a sanction is to affect a government action, this indicator at least, implies a sanction of that 
nature will, on average, not be effective.  
However, there is a counter argument to this. If for example, the private sector is negatively 
affected by the sanction and the government increases spending to offset this (e.g. the government 
increases social benefits or attempts to spend its way out of a recession), then an increase in 
government spending would indicate a sanction is working as intended. Because the household 
expenditures are higher than the trend (figure3.3) and employment is not adversely affected (figure 
3.9), this suggest that employment and private consumption are not issues governments will have 
to address after sanctions are implemented. And as such, the increase in government consumption 
is not an indication the sanction is effective.    
 












3.5.4. Military Expenditures 
Military expenditures in figure 3.5 are on average, about zero. This indicates that on average there 
is no change in the trend in the relative size of the country’s military from before to after a sanction 
is implemented. Which suggests that sanctions are not an effective mechanism by which one 
country can reduce the size of another country’s military. 
 
FIGURE 3.15 - MILITARY EXPENDITURES 
3.5.5. Economic Class 
Looking at the measures for employment by economic class, the percent of the labor force that is 
extremely poor averages out to about zero while the percentage of the labor force that is in the 
developed middle-class is below the trend by about a year. This suggests that some people who 
were in the middle-class are worse off after a sanction is implemented.  
The working middle-class indicator is the top-code for this statistic, which means that if a person 
is not in the working middle-class, they are either not working or are working in a lower income 













































































































































































































likely that the working middle-class had a decrease in pay (in real terms) rather than a decrease in 
employment. If these people attribute their lack of wealth to the sanction, then their discontent will 
likely be felt by the political establishment. The zero average on the working extremely poor metric 
is a bit surprising as, when it is coupled with the unemployment and labor force participation data, 








































































































































3.5.6. Development Assistance  
Development assistance is above the trend for an average of about three-quarters of a year after a 
sanction is implemented, implying there is a cost that extends beyond the targeted country when a 
sanction is imposed.  
 
FIGURE 3.7 - DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
 
3.5.7. Health Expenditures 
Health expenditures are another set of surprising metrics. After a sanction is implemented, on 
average, public health expenditures as a percentage of total health expenditure tends to rise on 
average, even while per capita households’ expenditures average out to about zero. This suggests 
that sanctions do not, in general, reduce public spending on healthcare in the target country.  
The public health expenditures are part of the government consumption expenditures and because 
both of these are above the trend, while military remains within the trend suggests that 





















































































































































































































































3.5.8. Employment  
The final averages are the unemployment and labor force participation rates (LFPR). We can see 
that unemployment is slightly above the prediction and the LFPR is above the prediction for more 
than half a year.  
The change in the level of unemployment is a good short-term indicator of the change in frictional 
unemployment and the change in the LFPR is a good indicator of the number of people 
enter/exiting the workforce, which is a good indication of the change in structural unemployment.  
On average then, figure 3.9 indicates that frictional unemployment is increasing while structural 
unemployment is decreasing.   
In this case, there is some churn in the economy; however, it would be difficult to argue that a 
country is significantly worse off in this type of employment scenario. As such, in general, 
sanctions targeting a country’s economy do not seem to be effective. This is an interesting result 
as the goal of broad sanctions is to cause damage to the economy as a whole. 
Most of the economies in the analysis are low income, and because of this, the ILO suggests their 
data is best used to assess the business cycles within a country. In this context, because there is 
only a modest increase in unemployment while there is an increase in the LFPR, this suggests the 



















































































































The general observations of the how indicators change when all types of countries are looked at in 
aggregate is that after a sanction is implemented, consumption expenditures increase, the 
percentage of people employed in the middle class decreases, and development assistance 
increases. These and the other less pronounced results are interesting general observations, but 
judging from the graphs, there are clearly some countries that are well outside the prediction, while 
others are within the predicted bounds.  
To get at how different types of countries are affected differently, the time series data will to be 
broken down by country type in the next sub-section.  
 
3.4.2. Results by Country Type  
In the context of sanctions, there are three primary factors that differentiate a given country: GDP, 
Political System, and Exports. According to Peksen (2009), the GDP of a country will have a 
significant impact on the effectiveness of a sanction. Countries with a high GDP are found to be 
affected less by sanctions. Hufbauer et al. (2007) write about the importance of a political system 
for the effectiveness of a sanction (however, the findings below counter some of those findings). 
And if a sanction affects trade, a country’s percent of GDP from exports is also an important factor 
to consider.  
In addition to considering the characteristics of the country, the characteristics of the sanction also 
needs to be considered. For this, the sanctions are divided into two groups: sanctions from 
congressional action and sanctions from executive orders. The sanctions from congressional action 
are broader in scope than sanctions from executive orders. Congressionally directed sanctions will 
generally target industries in a foreign country, while executive orders are generally limited to 
freezing individuals’ assets. The sanctions from executive orders only appear in the appendix.  
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To begin the categorization, each country, for each relevant sanctions episode, was put into one of 
three categories for each of the three factors. See tables 3.2 and 3.3. 




(Billion 2010 US$) 
Polity Index Exports of goods and 
services (% of GDP) 
1990 Iraq 71.26 -9 7.70 
1992 Cuba 35.31 -7 16.92 
1996 Cuba 31.02 -7 15.31 
1996 Iran 252.4 -6 20.20 
1996 Libya 27.9 -7 28.65 
1997 Iran 255.8 -6 17.28 
2003 Iraq 64.74 -9 77.39 
2006 Belarus  31.87 -7 60.06 
2006 Sudan 51.11 -4 19.07 
2006 Iran 389.55 -6 30.70 
2007 Iran 425.06 -6 29.70 
2009 Iran 438.92 -6 23.52 
2010 Iran 467.79 -6 25.40 
2011 Iran 485.33 -7 25.66 
2012 Burma 56.15 -6   
2012 Russia 1645.9 4 27.38 
2012 Moldova 6.16 9 43.48 




There are a couple of couple of items of note about table 3.2. First, the trade metric, exports as a 
percent of GDP, is used because generally imports are not significantly affected by sanctions. 
Sanctions that disallow exports from the sending country to the target country focus on finance 
and military related goods rather than inputs to trade (Hufbauer et al., 2007). There are export bans 
that are broader, but they are quite rare. In the period from 1990-2015, there were only three 
sanctions that targeted export bans in other sectors: the Iran 2007, 2009, and 2010 sanctions. These 
sanctions targeted the country’s oil refining infrastructure and thus included a ban on exporting 
construction equipment from the U.S. to Iran. Export as a percent of GDP are used in this analysis 
because trade is a significant issue when a country is the subject of economic sanctions. While 
trade linkage is generally a good measure for trade dependence, when assessing sanctions, using 
measures like this overemphasize the importance of imports.  
The second item to note is that while purchasing power parity is a good measure to use when 
assessing the standard of living of a country (which is why PPP is the preferred choice when 
looking at household expenditures and government expenditures), when assessing at relative size 
of a country economy, the dollar value of production is a better measure to use. Because of this, 






TABLE 3.3 - COUNTRY CATEGORY 
GDP Political System Exports 
 High GDP  Democracy High Exports 
 
 Iran  2014 Iraq 2003 Iraq 
 

















   
Burundi 
  
      
 Med GDP  Neither Med Exports 
 
 Cuba  
 
Venezuela  2014 Iraq 
 
 Libya  
 
Zimbabwe 2006-2011 Iran 
 






















      
 Low GDP  Dictatorship Low Exports 
 
 Moldova  1990, 2003 Iraq 1990 Iraq 
 






 Somalia  
 
Iran 1996, 1997 Iran 
 
















The countries were placed into one of the three categories in each of the columns based on natural 
breaking points in the data. For example, any country with a GDP over $100 billion was placed in 
the high category while any county with a GDP of less than $20 billion was placed in the low 
category, the other countries were placed in the medium GDP category. The countries’ exports 
were categorized in a similar way. For the exports of goods and services as a percent of GDP, the 
countries were divided such that if a country’s exports as a percent of GDP was less than or equal 
to 20% the country was placed in the low exports category. If the country’s exports as a percent of 
GDP was above 40% it was placed in the high category and if the country’s exports as a percent 
of GDP was not in either the high or the low category, it was placed in the medium exports 
category.  
Countries were placed in the political systems categories based on the Polity IV definition at the 
time of the sanction. If a country was above zero on the Polity index, it was placed in the democracy 
category; if the country was less than negative eight, it was placed in the dictatorship category; 
and if the country was between negative eight and zero it was placed in the neither category.  
Even when breaking the countries up into these groups, there is still a lot of data to look at. To be 
able to make sense out of it, country averaging and differencing was used (see appendix for the 
full break out of the data). In figure 3.10, the dark bars are the average of the high indicator for the 
category minus the average for the low indicator for the category. In the political system chart, for 
example, the dark bar is the average of the indicator for countries with democracies minus the 
average of the indicator for countries with dictatorships. The light bar is the medium indicator 
minus the low indicator, and on the political systems chart, this is the average for the indicator for 




In all cases, the comparison is to the low indicator, and the interpretation of the height of the bar 
is the difference in the average number of years the category indicator was outside the predicted 
bounds. For example, if a low category indicator was below the bounds for an average of 2 years, 
and that same high category indicator was above the predicted bounds for an average of 3 years, 
the index value would be +5.  
A sensitivity analysis of the results was performed on two factors: outliers and grouping. 
Determining if the presence of an outlier affected the results consisted of iterating through each 
sanctions episode, removing it from the average, and assessing whether the exclusion led to a 
different qualitative interpretation of the results. In one case, the political systems analysis, there 
were two sanctions episodes that, if each were removed individually, would have changed the 
assessment of the quantitative outcome.  
In all three cases, the sanctions episodes removed for the sensitivity analysis was in the low 
category for the factor (political system, GDP, and exports). This suggests the categorization of 
the sanctions effectively discriminated between the important factors in the data, which is expected 
based on the literature cited at the beginning of this sub-section.  
Assessing the effect of grouping consisted of adjusting the size of each group within the factors 
(GDP, political system, and exports), until the next sanctions episode above and/or below was 
removed from one group and added to the other. In the case of the GDP grouping, there was no 
significant change in the qualitative results. This is because the countries with similar GDPs had 
similar averages. When the political system groupings where shifted there was a larger increase 
the difference in the percentage of the labor force in the extreme poverty in one grouping shift, 
and in another shift, there was a less pronounced difference in the decrease in the percentage of 
labor force in the developing middle class. In both of these cases however, there was a similar 
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interpretation of the results, just a difference in the magnitude. For the export grouping, one of the 
grouping shifts moved one of the outliers between groups. The move shifted Cuba 1992 from the 
low export group to the medium export group. This shift had a significant impact on the results 
and will be discussed in the exports sub-section.  
3.4.3. Political Systems 
 
FIGURE 3.10 - POLITICAL SYSTEM INDICES 
Looking at the political systems, we can see there is a large difference between a constrained 
democracy and a dictatorship on a variety of these indicators. A constrained democracy is a 
political system where population votes, but their voting choices are significantly constrained by 
the politicians currently in power. In a full democracy, voters’ options are not significantly limited 
by the current politicians. The findings in Hufbauer et al. (2007) indicated that a dictatorship would 
not be affected as much by sanctions as a democracy (which is why the first metric is democracy 
























Constrained Democracy - Dictatorship
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more people in the working extremely poor category under constrained democracy than in under 
a dictatorship and there are more people in the extremely poor category in a democracy than in a 
constrained democracy. The converse is true of the middle-class category.  
It is also clear in the data, that after a sanction is implemented the change in the indicators is more 
pronounced in a constrained democracy than in a full democracy which is counter to one of the 
finding in Hufbauer et al. (2007). The second item of note is the household expenditures index, 
the private healthcare expenditures index, and the extremely poor index are relatively high. This 
implies that after sanctions were implemented, household welfare significantly decreased. The 
final item to note is that the government consumption index and the military expenditure index are 
high. Putting all this together suggests that sanctions on a constrained democracy will not have 
negative affect on the government, while it will have a negative effect on households.  
The last result however, is highly sensitive to the Libya 1996 and the Venezuela 2014 sanctions. 
These countries are in the constrained democracy category and the indicators for these countries 
were above the forecast for all indicators except military expenditures, development assistance and 
the unemployment. The without the Libya 1996 sanction, the government consumption 
expenditures indicator would be close to zero, and without the Venezuela 2014 sanction, both of 
the health expenditure indicators would be close to zero.  
Even considering this sensitivity, these results emphasize the fact that sanctions against dictators 
will generally not be effective. If the economic cost of the sanctions are low, then the incentive to 
bend to the sanction sender’s will is small. The country-level indicators show that while various 
forms of democracies are affected by increasing expenses and decreasing wages, countries with 
dictators do not suffer the same fate. Thus, this analysis, with new data and a new analytic method, 
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confirms one of the major findings of Hufbauer et al. (2007); Escriba-Folch (2012); and Marinov 
(2005): sanctioning dictators is not effective. 
3.4.4. GDP 
 
FIGURE 3.11 – GDP INDICES 
 
The indicators in figure 3.11 that are of most interest is unemployment and LFPR. Relative to the 
low GDP countries, the medium GDP countries have a decrease in LFPR and an increase in 
unemployment. This is the only case where these two indicators have opposite signs.  This suggests 
that after a sanction, countries with medium GDP have a labor force in positions that are more 
susceptible to sanctions than the other economy types. In addition, the increase in household 
consumption and government expenditures implies that while households may be affected by 























GDP Difference: Congressional Sanction 
High GDP - Low GDP
Medium GDP - Low GDP
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The health expenditure indicators in this difference chart are sensitive to the Moldova 2014 
sanction. The difference for the public health expenditures indicator would have been three points 
less and the health expenditures per capita would have been one point less if this sanctions episode 
was not included in the differencing. Even if these points are not included in the differencing chart, 
the difference between the high GDP and the low GDP health expenditures are still large and since 
the public portion of the health expense is above the trend longer than the private portion of the 
health expense, this would be a boon for the people within the country. This suggests that nations 
with high GDP that are subject to sanctions may increase spending on social programs, which 
could be motivated by the government’s desire to keep the populace happy during the upheaval 
caused by the sanction. 
3.4.5. Export as a Percent of GDP  
 



















Exports: High to Low as a Share of GDP
High Exports - Low Exports
Medium Exports - Low Exports
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Finally, looking at exports as a percent of GDP, this chart tells an interesting story in that if a 
country has a relatively high share of GDP from export, after a sanction is imposed, military 
expenditures increase. This is an intuitive result because if a country is reliant on exports for 
government and household revenue, and those exports are threatened, to combat this threat, the 
country starts a military buildup. Compounding this is that development assistance after a sanction 
decreased the more a country exports, which further removes non-military options for a country 
that relies on exports.  However, the military expenditure indicator and the household expenditure 
indicator are highly sensitive to the Cuba 1992 sanction. If this sanction is not included, the 
expenditure differences are close to zero.  
Considering the difference that is not as sensitive, we can see that in countries with a high 
percentage of GDP from exports, the government expenditures are generally less than the trend. 
This suggests that sanctions reduce the revenue available to governments and thereby cause some 
direct harm to the politicians who could affect the policy targeted by the sanction. This implies 
that sanctions against countries of this type would have a better chance of success than other types 
of countries.  
3.5.  Conclusion  
 
From looking at the indicators across countries, it is clear that the middle class is squeezed, 
governments are not necessarily affected, and development assistance increases after sanctions. 
What is also clear from the cross-country look is that these indicators vary quite a bit from country 
to country. Because of this variance, looking at country type is an important step.  
From the country type data, there are three main points: constrained democracies are affected more 
than democracies, countries in the medium GDP category suffer from a reduction in the labor force 
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participation rate and an increase in unemployment, and there is a decrease in government 
expenditures from countries with a high percentage of GDP from exports. 
Sanctions are a contentious issue. Their effectiveness is constantly called into question as well as 
their morality. This analysis adds to the discussion by using a unique analytic technique to make 
generalizations about the effects of sanctions. From this analysis, it is clear that a sanction has a 
higher likelihood of success if the target of the sanction earns a relatively percentage high of its 
GDP from exports. The second finding of this analysis is that if the target country of a sanction is 
in the medium GDP category, then employment will decrease after a sanction is implemented. The 
final finding is that while political systems are important in a sanctions decision, constrained 
democracies seem to be affected more than democracies.  
This research was focused on broad indicators across a broad spectrum of sanctions episodes, 
and a few new issues were brought to light. This is certainly not the end of the discussion on the 
topic, but rather brings a new argument to the discourse about sanctions in general. While each 
sanction is different and each sanction targets a unique country in a unique situation, some things 
tend to hold constant in spite of the situational differences. The most important constant is that 
sanctions must be carefully considered prior to their implementation if the desired outcome is to 
be achieved. In many in many cases however, sanctions are not the correct policy instrument to 
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Are Sanctions Motivated by Protectionism Appendix 
Regression with occupations within Industries 




term Coefficient Coefficient 
(Intercept) -64.06 ‡ -17.40 ‡ 
goalPC -41.53 ‡ -11.09 ‡ 
goalRC -7.49 ‡ -11.15 ‡ 
goalMil -1.42 ‡ 0.12 ‡ 
goalMI -46.02 ‡ -12.93 
 
voteWparty -17.38 ‡ 14.11 ‡ 
regime13 -1.00 ‡ -0.22 
 
relationsanc -40.57 ‡ -10.79 ‡ 
MgtOcc 
    
ServOcc 
    
SalesOcc 
    
NROcc 
    
TransOcc 
    
AgInd 
    




AgSale -1.04 ‡ 0.54 
 
AgNR -0.07 ‡ 0.11 
 
AgTrans 1.89 ‡ 0.23 
 
ConInd 





ConServ -0.14 ‡ -0.02 
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WholeSales -0.71 ‡ -0.46 * 
WholeNR -0.40 ‡ 0.35 ‡ 
WholeTrans -0.63 ‡ 0.14 
 
RetInd 
    
RetMgt -0.53 ‡ 0.71 
 









RetTrans 4.19 ‡ 1.20 
 
TransInd 


































InfoTrans -0.18 ‡ -0.27 ‡ 
FinInd 
    













FinTrans -0.14 ‡ -0.66 
 
ProfInd 
    












ProfTrans 0.07 † 0.34 ‡ 
EduInd 
    










EduNR -1.57 ‡ 0.49 ‡ 
EduTrans 1.02 ‡ 0.01 
 
ArtsInd 























































PubTrans 0.54 ‡ -0.38 
 
Residual Deviance: 573.2979  
  
AIC: 861.2979  
    
 
The first five of the location quotient codes represent the five main occupations across all 
industries: Management, Service, Sales, Natural Resources and Construction, and Production and 
Transportation. Every sixth location quotient code represents all occupations within a given 
industry: Agriculture, Construction, Manufacturing, Wholesale trade, Retail trade, Transportation, 
Information, Finance, Professional, Education, Arts, Other, and Public administration. The other 
location quotient codes represent a single occupation within a single industry. The occupations are 
always in the order listed above.  
Occupations within Industries. Looking specifically at the “yes” choice variable and starting 
with the occupation within each industry regression, we see mostly positive and significant 
coefficients in the management sectors as well as mostly positive coefficients when the results are 
significant in the other sectors.  However, for all of the results the odds ratios are quite small. This 
is an intuitive result as this is a regression for all sanctions that were voted on, and it is unlikely 
that workers could consistently organize at such a small level. In other words, representatives 
probably would know how each occupation within each industry would be affected by a given 
sanction, nor is it likely that each occupation within a given industry would work to ensure their 




Sanctions Bills  
Year Name assetFreeze NegAF ImportBan NegIB Con 
2006 Belarus Democracy 1 0 0 0 0 
2006 Darfur peace 1 0 0 0 0 
2007 1996 Iran Amendment 0 0 0 0 1 
2007 2007 Iran Energy Divest 0 0 0 0 1 
2009 2009 Iran Energy Divest 0 0 0 0 1 
2010 2010 Iran Divestment 0 0 0 0 0 
2011 Iran, NK, Syria 0 0 1 0 0 
2012 Iran, Syria Human Rights 0 0 0 0 0 
2012 Burmese Freedom 0 0 1 0 0 
2013 Hezbollah 1 0 0 0 0 
2015 Remove Iran Sanctions 0 1 0 1 0 
  NegCon ExportBan NegEB Trans NegTrans 
2006 Belarus Democracy 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 Darfur peace 0 1 0 0 0 
2007 1996 Iran Amendment 0 1 0 0 0 
2007 2007 Iran Energy Divest 0 1 0 0 0 
2009 2009 Iran Energy Divest 0 1 0 0 0 
2010 2010 Iran Divestment 0 1 0 0 0 
2011 Iran, NK, Syria 0 1 0 0 0 
2012 Iran, Syria Human Rights 0 1 0 1 0 
2012 Burmese Freedom 0 0 0 0 0 
2013 Hezbollah 0 0 0 0 0 
2015 Remove Iran Sanctions 1 0 1 0 1 
  Invest NegInvest Oil NegOIl Tech NegTech 
2006 Belarus Democracy 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 Darfur peace 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2007 1996 Iran Amendment 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2007 2007 Iran Energy Divest 1 0 1 0 0 0 
2009 2009 Iran Energy Divest 1 0 1 0 0 0 
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2010 2010 Iran Divestment 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2011 Iran, NK, Syria 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2012 Iran, Syria Human Rights 1 0 1 0 1 0 
2012 Burmese Freedom 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2013 Hezbollah 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2015 Remove Iran Sanctions 0 1 0 1 0 1 
  Military NegMilitary Prop NegProp People NegPeople 
2006 Belarus Democracy 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2006 Darfur peace 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2007 1996 Iran Amendment 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2007 2007 Iran Energy Divest 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2009 2009 Iran Energy Divest 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2010 2010 Iran Divestment 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2011 Iran, NK, Syria 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2012 Iran, Syria Human Rights 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2012 Burmese Freedom 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2013 Hezbollah 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2015 Remove Iran Sanctions 0 0 0 1 0 1 
  goalPC goalRC goalMil goalMI regime13 relationsanc 
2006 Belarus Democracy 1 0 0 0 2 1 
2006 Darfur peace 0 0 1 0 2 2 
2007 1996 Iran Amendment 0 0 0 1 2 1 
2007 2007 Iran Energy Divest 0 0 0 1 2 1 
2009 2009 Iran Energy Divest 0 0 0 1 2 1 
2010 2010 Iran Divestment 0 0 0 1 1 1 
2011 Iran, NK, Syria 0 0 0 1 1 1 
2012 Iran, Syria Human Rights 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2012 Burmese Freedom 0 1 0 0 1 2 
2013 Hezbollah 0 0 1 0 1 2 




Sanctions since 1990 not included in study 
Year Country Executive Order Only Congressional Action assetFreeze NegAF ImportBan 












   
1993 Cuba 1 













   







   











   
































2012 Russia   1 1 1   
2012 Moldova   1       






































2016 North Korea 
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Year Country NegIB Con NegCon ExportBan NegEB 
1990 Iraq 
     
1990 Iraq 
     
1992 Cuba 
     
1993 Cuba 
     
1996 Cuba 
     
1996 Iran 
     
1996 Libya 
     
1997 Sudan 
     
1997 Iran 
     
2001 Balkens 
     
2003 Zimbabwe 
     
2003 Iraq 1 
    
2005 Zimbabwe 
     
2006 Belarus 
     
2006 Sudan 
     
2006 Sudan 
     
2007 Lebanon 
     
2008 Zimbabwe 
     
2010 Somalia 
     
2011 Libya 
     
2012 Russia 1         
2012 Moldova           
2012 Somalia 
     
2012 Yemen 




     
2014 DRC 
     
2014 Iraq 
     
2014 South Sudan 
     
2014 Russia 
     
2014 Venezuela  
     
2015 Burundi 
     
2016 North Korea 




     
Year Country Trans NegTrans Invest NegInvest Oil 
1990 Iraq 
     
1990 Iraq 
     
1992 Cuba 
     
1993 Cuba 














     
1997 Iran 
     
2001 Balkens 
     
2003 Zimbabwe 
     
2003 Iraq 




     
2006 Belarus 
     
2006 Sudan 
     
2006 Sudan 
     
2007 Lebanon 
     
2008 Zimbabwe 
     
2010 Somalia 
     
2011 Libya 
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2012 Russia           
2012 Moldova           
2012 Somalia 
     
2012 Yemen 
     
2014 CAR 
     
2014 DRC 
     
2014 Iraq 
     
2014 South Sudan 
     
2014 Russia 
     
2014 Venezuela  
     
2015 Burundi 
     





     
Year Country NegOIl Tech NegTech Military NegMilitary 
1990 Iraq 
     
1990 Iraq 








     
1996 Cuba 
     
1996 Iran 
     
1996 Libya 
     
1997 Sudan 
     
1997 Iran 




     
2003 Zimbabwe 
     
2003 Iraq 
     
2005 Zimbabwe 
     
2006 Belarus 
     
2006 Sudan 
     
2006 Sudan 




     
2008 Zimbabwe 
     
2010 Somalia 
     
2011 Libya 
     
2012 Russia           
2012 Moldova           
2012 Somalia 
     
2012 Yemen 
     
2014 CAR 
     
2014 DRC 
     
2014 Iraq 
     
2014 South Sudan 
     
2014 Russia 
     
2014 Venezuela  
     
2015 Burundi 
     
2016 North Korea 
     
2017 Sudan 
     
Year Country Prop NegProp People NegPeople goalPC 






     
1992 Cuba 
     
1993 Cuba 
     
1996 Cuba 
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2012 Russia 1 1 1 1 1 
2012 Moldova   1   1 1 













































2016 North Korea 






Year Country goalRC goalMil goalMI regime13 relationsanc 
1990 Iraq 






     
1993 Cuba 1 
    
1996 Cuba 








   
1997 Sudan 




     
2001 Balkens 
     
2003 Zimbabwe 
     
2003 Iraq 1 
    
2005 Zimbabwe 
     
2006 Belarus 
     
2006 Sudan 
     
2006 Sudan 
     
2007 Lebanon 
     
2008 Zimbabwe 
     
2010 Somalia 
     
2011 Libya 
     
2012 Russia           
2012 Moldova 1 1       
2012 Somalia 
     
2012 Yemen 
     
2014 CAR 
     
2014 DRC 
     
2014 Iraq 
     
2014 South Sudan 





2014 Venezuela  
     
2015 Burundi 
     
2016 North Korea 
     
2017 Sudan 





All Active Sanctions 
Balkans-Related Sanctions  
Belarus Sanctions 
Burundi Sanctions  
Central African Republic Sanctions  
Counter Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions 
Counter Terrorism Sanctions  
Cuba Sanctions  
Cyber-related Sanctions 
Democratic Republic of the Congo-Related Sanctions 
Iran Sanctions  
Iraq-Related Sanctions  
Lebanon-Related Sanctions 
Libya Sanctions   
Magnitsky Sanctions  
Non-Proliferation Sanctions 
North Korea Sanctions   
Rough Diamond Trade Controls 
Somalia Sanctions 
Sudan Sanctions  
South Sudan-related Sanctions 
Syria Sanctions 
Transnational Criminal Organizations  
Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions  





Executive orders for current sanctions (bold is since 2005) 
13304 Termination of Emergencies With Respect to Yugoslavia and Modification of Executive 
Order 13219 of June 26, 2001 
13219  Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten International Stabilization Efforts in the 
Western Balkans (Effective Date - June 27, 2001) 
13405 Blocking Property of Certain Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or 
Institutions in Belarus (Effective Date - June 19, 2006) 
 
13667 - Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in the Central 
African Republic (May 13, 2014) 
 
12978 Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions With Significant Narcotics Traffickers 
(Effective Date - October 22, 1995)  
 
Executive Order 13712 - Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation 
in Burundi (November 23, 2015) 
13372 Clarification of Certain Executive Orders Blocking Property and Prohibiting 
Certain Transactions (February 16, 2005) 
13268 Termination of Emergency With Respect to the Taliban and Amendment of Executive 
Order 13224 of September 23, 2001 (July 2, 2002) 
13224 Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten To 
Commit, or Support Terrorism (Effective Date - September 24, 2001) 
13099 Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace 
Process (Effective Date - August 21, 1998) 
12947 Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace 
Process (January 23, 1995) 
12854 Implementation of the Cuban Democracy Act (Effective Date - July 4, 1993) 
13694 - Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-
Enabled Activities (April 1, 2015) 
13671 - Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to the 
Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (July 8, 2014) 
13413 Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (Effective Date - October 30, 2006) 
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13716 - Revocation Of Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, And 13645 With Respect To 
Iran, Amendment Of Executive Order 13628 With Respect To Iran, And Provision Of 
Implementation Authorities For Aspects Of Certain Statutory Sanctions Outside The Scope Of 
U.S. Commitments Under The Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action Of July 14, 2015 (Effective 
Date - January 16, 2016) 
13645 Authorizing the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Freedom 
and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 and Additional Sanctions With Respect To Iran 
(Effective Date - July 1, 2013) 
13628  Authorizing the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 and Additional Sanctions with Respect to 
Iran (Effective Date - October 9, 2012) 
13622 Authorizing Additional Sanctions With Respect to Iran (Effective Date - July 30, 
2012)  
13608 Prohibiting Certain Transactions With and Suspending Entry Into the United States 
of Foreign Sanctions Evaders With Respect to Iran and Syria (Effective Date - May 1, 
2012) 
13606 Blocking the Property and Suspending Entry Into the United States of Certain 
Persons With Respect to Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and 
Syria via Information Technology (Effective Date - April 23, 2012)   
13599 Blocking Property of the Government of Iran and Iranian Financial Institutions 
(Effective Date - February 6, 2012) 
13590 Authorizing the Imposition of Certain Sanctions With Respect to the Provision of 
Goods, Services, Technology, or Support for Iran’s Energy and Petrochemical Sectors 
(Effective Date - November 20, 2011) 
13574 Authorizing the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran 
Sanctions Act of 1996, as Amended (Effective Date - May 23, 2011)  
13553 Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to Serious Human Rights 
Abuses By The Government of Iran and Taking Certain Other Actions (Effective Date - 
September 29, 2010) 
13059  Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Iran (Effective Date - August 20, 1997) 
12959  Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Iran (Effective Date - May 7, 1995) 
12957  Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the Development of Iranian Petroleum 
Resources (Effective Date - March 16, 1995) 
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12613  Prohibiting Imports From Iran (Effective Date - October 29, 1987) 
12294  Suspension of Litigation Against Iran (Effective Date - February 26, 1981) 
12284  Restrictions on the Transfer of Property of the Former Shah of Iran (Effective Date - 
January 23, 1981) 
12283  Non-Prosecution of Claims of Hostages and for Actions at the United States Embassy 
and Elsewhere (Effective Date - January 23, 1981) 
12282  Revocation of Prohibitions Against Transactions Involving Iran (Effective Date - January 
23, 1981) 
12281  Direction To Transfer Certain Iranian Government Assets (Effective Date - January 23, 
1981) 
12280  Direction To Transfer Iranian Government Financial Assets Held By Non-Banking 
Institutions (Effective Date - January 23, 1981) 
12279  Direction To Transfer Iranian Govt. Assets Held By Domestic Banks (Effective Date - 
January 23, 1981) 
12278  Direction To Transfer Iranian Government Assets Overseas (Effective Date - January 23, 
1981) 
12277  Direction To Transfer Iranian Government Assets (Effective Date - January 23, 1981) 
12276  Direction Relating to Establishment of Escrow Accounts (Effective Date - January 23, 
1981) 
12211  Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Iran (Effective Date - April 17, 1980) 
12205  Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Iran (Effective Date - April 17, 1980) 
12170  Blocking Iranian Government Property (Effective Date - November 14, 1979) 
13668 Ending Immunities Granted to the Development Fund for Iraq and Certain Other 
Iraqi Property and Interests in Property Pursuant to Executive Order 13303, as 
Amended  (May 27, 2014) 
13438  Blocking Property of Certain Persons Who Threaten Stabilization Efforts in Iraq 
(July 17, 2007)  




13350  Termination of Emergency Declared in Executive Order 12722 With Respect to Iraq and 
Modification of Executive Order 13290, Executive Order 13303, and Executive Order 
13315  (Effective Date - July 30, 2004) 
13315 Blocking Property of the Former Iraqi Regime, Its Senior Officials and Their Family 
Members, and Taking Certain Other Actions (Effective Date - August 29, 2003) 
13303  Protecting the Development Fund for Iraq and Certain Other Property in Which Iraq Has 
an Interest (May 22, 2003) 
13290   Confiscating and Vesting Certain Iraqi Property (March 20, 2003) 
12817  Transfer Of Certain Iraqi Government Assets Held By Domestic Banks (Effective Date - 
October 23, 1992) 
12724  Blocking Iraqi Government Property And Prohibiting Transactions With Iraq (Effective 
Date - August 9, 1990) 
12722  Blocking Iraqi Government Property And Prohibiting Transactions With Iraq (Effective 
Date - August 2, 1990) 
13441 Blocking Property Of Persons Undermining The Sovereignty Of Lebanon Or Its 
Democratic Processes And Institutions (August 1, 2007) 
13726 - Blocking Property and Suspending Entry into the United States of Persons Contributing 
to the Situation in Libya (April 19, 2016) 
13566 Blocking Property and Prohibiting Certain Transactions Related to Libya (Effective 
Date - February 25, 2011) 
13608 Prohibiting Certain Transactions With And Suspending Entry Into The United 
States Of Foreign Sanctions Evaders With Respect To Iran And Syria (Effective Date - 
May 1, 2012)  
13382 Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their 
Supporters (Effective Date - June 29, 2005)  
13094 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Effective Date - July 29, 1998)  
12938 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Effective Date - November 14, 1994) 
13722 - Blocking Property of the Government of North Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea, 
and Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to North Korea (Effective date - March 16, 
2016) 
13687 - Imposing Additional Sanctions with Respect to North Korea (Effective date - 
January 2, 2015) 
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13570 - Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect To North Korea (Effective date - 
April 18, 2011) 
13551 - Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to North Korea (Effective date 
- August 30, 2010) 
13466 - Continuing Certain Restrictions With Respect to North Korea and North Korean 
Nationals (June 26, 2008)  
13312  - Executive Order Implementing the Clean Diamond Trade Act (Effective Date - July 30, 
2003) 
13620 Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to 
Somalia (Effective Date - July 20, 2012) 
13536 Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Somalia 
(Effective Date - April 13, 2010)  
13412 Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With the Government of Sudan 
(October 13, 2006) 
13400 Blocking Property of Persons in Connection With the Conflict in Sudan's Darfur 
Region (Effective Date - April 27, 2006) 
13067 Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Sudan 
(Effective Date - November 4, 1997) 
13664 - Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to South Sudan (April 3, 2014) 
13608 Prohibiting Certain Transactions With and Suspending Entry Into the United States 
of Foreign Sanctions Evaders With Respect to Iran and Syria (Effective Date - May 1, 
2012) 
13606 Blocking the Property and Suspending Entry Into the United States of Certain 
Persons With Respect to Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and 
Syria via Information Technology (Effective Date - April 23, 2012) 
13582 Blocking Property of the Government of Syria and Prohibiting Certain Transactions 
with Respect to Syria (August 18, 2011) 
13573 Blocking Property Of Senior Officials Of The Government Of Syria (May 18, 2011) 
13572 Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to Human Rights Abuses in 
Syria (April 29, 2011) 
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13460  Blocking Property of Additional Persons in Connection With the National 
Emergency With Respect to Syria (February 15, 2008) 
13399  Blocking Property of Additional Persons in Connection With the National 
Emergency With Respect to Syria (Effective Date - April 26, 2006) 
13338 Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods to 
Syria (Effective Date - May 12, 2004) 
13581 Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations (Effective Date - July 
25, 2011) 
13685 - Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting Certain Transactions with 
Respect to the Crimea Region of Ukraine (December 19, 2014) 
13662 - Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine 
(March 20, 2014) 
13661 - Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine 
(March 17, 2014) 
13660 - Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine 
(March 6, 2014) 
13692 - Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the 
Situation in Venezuela (March 9, 2015) 
13611 - Blocking Property of Persons Threatening the Peace, Security, or Stability of 
Yemen (Effective Date - May 16, 2012) 
13469 Blocking Property of Additional Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or 
Institutions in Zimbabwe (July 25, 2008)  
13391 Blocking Property of Additional Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or 
Institutions in Zimbabwe (Effective Date - November 23, 2005)  
13288 Blocking Property of Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in 
Zimbabwe (Effective Date - March 7, 2003) 
 
Variables 
Variable Variable Type Variable Description 
assetFreeze binary Did the sanction include an 
asset freeze 
  
Con binary Did the sanction ban 




ExportBan binary Did the sanction prohibit 
certain exports 
  
Tech binary Did the sanction include a 
ban on technology 
  
Invest binary Did the sanction include a 
ban on finance and/or 
investment 
  
Oil binary Did the sanction include a 
ban on oil imports 
  
People binary Did the sanction target 
specific people 
  
NegAF binary Any variable with the prefix "Neg" captures a removal of the sanction. In this case it 
is the removal of an asset freeze 
ImportBan binary This variable captured a sanction that banned imports from the target country 
NegIB binary Removal of an import ban   
NegCon binary Removal of a construction 
ban 
  
NegEB binary Removal of an export ban   
Trans binary Sanctions on transportation    
NegTrans binary Removal of a transportation 
ban 
  
NegInvest binary Removal of an investment 
ban 
  
NegOIl binary Removal of an oil ban   
NegTech binary Removal of a technology 
ban 
  
Military binary Sanction on exporting 
military equipment 
  
NegMilitary binary Removal of a military 
equipment ban 
  
Prop binary Sanction on property   
NegProp binary Removal of a sanction on 
property 
  
People binary Sanction on specific people   
NegPeople binary Removal of a sanction on 
specific people 
  
goalMil binary Was the goal of the sanction to curtail military development (counter proliferation) 
goalMI binary Was the goal of the sanction 
to end a military 
intervention 
 
regime13 1,2,3 Target country regime 1 = 
democracy; 3 = dictator; 2 is 
in between  
 
relationsanc 1,2,3 Was the relationship with the target country prior to the sanction: 1 = antagonistic, 2 = 
neutral, or 3 =cordial 
goalRC binary Was the goal of the sanction a change in the regime of the target country 
goalPC binary Was the goal of the sanction a change in the political structure of the target country 
 
Variable  Occupation Industry 
MgtOcc positive real 
(location quotient) 
Management, business, science, and arts 
occupations 
All 
ServOcc positive real 
(location quotient) 
Service occupations All 
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SalesOcc positive real 
(location quotient) 
Sales and office occupations All 
NROcc positive real 
(location quotient) 
Natural resources, construction, and 
maintenance occupations 
All 
TransOcc positive real 
(location quotient) 
Production, transportation, and material 
moving occupations 
All 
AgInd positive real 
(location quotient) 
All  Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, 
and mining 
AgMgt positive real 
(location quotient) 
Management, business, science, and arts 
occupations 
 Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, 
and mining 
AgServ positive real 
(location quotient) 
Service occupations  Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, 
and mining 
AgSale positive real 
(location quotient) 
Sales and office occupations  Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, 
and mining 
AgNR positive real 
(location quotient) 
Natural resources, construction, and 
maintenance occupations 
 Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, 
and mining 
AgTrans positive real 
(location quotient) 
Production, transportation, and material 
moving occupations 
 Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, 
and mining 
ConInd positive real 
(location quotient) 
All  Construction 
ConMgt positive real 
(location quotient) 
Management, business, science, and arts 
occupations 
 Construction 
ConServ positive real 
(location quotient) 
Service occupations  Construction 
ConSale positive real 
(location quotient) 
Sales and office occupations  Construction 
ConNR positive real 
(location quotient) 
Natural resources, construction, and 
maintenance occupations 
 Construction 
ConTrans positive real 
(location quotient) 
Production, transportation, and material 
moving occupations 
 Construction 
ManInd positive real 
(location quotient) 
All  Manufacturing 
ManMgt positive real 
(location quotient) 
Management, business, science, and arts 
occupations 
 Manufacturing 
ManServ positive real 
(location quotient) 
Service occupations  Manufacturing 
ManSale positive real 
(location quotient) 
Sales and office occupations  Manufacturing 
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ManNR positive real 
(location quotient) 
Natural resources, construction, and 
maintenance occupations 
 Manufacturing 
ManTrans positive real 
(location quotient) 
Production, transportation, and material 
moving occupations 
 Manufacturing 
WholeInd positive real 
(location quotient) 
All  Wholesale trade 
WholeMgt positive real 
(location quotient) 
Management, business, science, and arts 
occupations 
 Wholesale trade 
WholeServ positive real 
(location quotient) 





Sales and office occupations  Wholesale trade 
WholeNR positive real 
(location quotient) 
Natural resources, construction, and 
maintenance occupations 





Production, transportation, and material 
moving occupations 
 Wholesale trade 
RetInd positive real 
(location quotient) 
All  Retail trade 
RetMgt positive real 
(location quotient) 
Management, business, science, and arts 
occupations 
 Retail trade 
RetServ positive real 
(location quotient) 
Service occupations  Retail trade 
RetSale positive real 
(location quotient) 
Sales and office occupations  Retail trade 
RetNR positive real 
(location quotient) 
Natural resources, construction, and 
maintenance occupations 
 Retail trade 
RetTrans positive real 
(location quotient) 
Production, transportation, and material 
moving occupations 
 Retail trade 
TransInd positive real 
(location quotient) 
All  Transportation and warehousing, and 
utilities 
TransMgt positive real 
(location quotient) 
Management, business, science, and arts 
occupations 
 Transportation and warehousing, and 
utilities 
TransServ positive real 
(location quotient) 
Service occupations  Transportation and warehousing, and 
utilities 
TransSale positive real 
(location quotient) 
Sales and office occupations  Transportation and warehousing, and 
utilities 
TransNR positive real 
(location quotient) 
Natural resources, construction, and 
maintenance occupations 








Production, transportation, and material 
moving occupations 
 Transportation and warehousing, and 
utilities 
InfoInd positive real 
(location quotient) 
All  Information 
InfoMgt positive real 
(location quotient) 
Management, business, science, and arts 
occupations 
 Information 
InfoServ positive real 
(location quotient) 
Service occupations  Information 
InfoSales positive real 
(location quotient) 
Sales and office occupations  Information 
InfoNR positive real 
(location quotient) 
Natural resources, construction, and 
maintenance occupations 
 Information 
InfoTrans positive real 
(location quotient) 
Production, transportation, and material 
moving occupations 
 Information 
FinInd positive real 
(location quotient) 
All  Finance and insurance, and real estate and 
rental and leasing 
FinMgt positive real 
(location quotient) 
Management, business, science, and arts 
occupations 
 Finance and insurance, and real estate and 
rental and leasing 
FinServ positive real 
(location quotient) 
Service occupations  Finance and insurance, and real estate and 
rental and leasing 
FinSale positive real 
(location quotient) 
Sales and office occupations  Finance and insurance, and real estate and 
rental and leasing 
FinNR positive real 
(location quotient) 
Natural resources, construction, and 
maintenance occupations 
 Finance and insurance, and real estate and 
rental and leasing 
FinTrans positive real 
(location quotient) 
Production, transportation, and material 
moving occupations 
 Finance and insurance, and real estate and 
rental and leasing 
ProfInd positive real 
(location quotient) 
All  Professional, scientific, and management, 
and administrative and waste management 
services 
ProfMgt positive real 
(location quotient) 
Management, business, science, and arts 
occupations 
 Professional, scientific, and management, 
and administrative and waste management 
services 
ProfServ positive real 
(location quotient) 
Service occupations  Professional, scientific, and management, 
and administrative and waste management 
services 
ProfSale positive real 
(location quotient) 
Sales and office occupations  Professional, scientific, and management, 




ProfNR positive real 
(location quotient) 
Natural resources, construction, and 
maintenance occupations 
 Professional, scientific, and management, 
and administrative and waste management 
services 
ProfTrans positive real 
(location quotient) 
Production, transportation, and material 
moving occupations 
 Professional, scientific, and management, 
and administrative and waste management 
services 
EduInd positive real 
(location quotient) 
All  Educational services, and health care and 
social assistance 
EduMgt positive real 
(location quotient) 
Management, business, science, and arts 
occupations 
 Educational services, and health care and 
social assistance 
EduServ positive real 
(location quotient) 
Service occupations  Educational services, and health care and 
social assistance 
EduServ positive real 
(location quotient) 
Sales and office occupations  Educational services, and health care and 
social assistance 
EduNR positive real 
(location quotient) 
Natural resources, construction, and 
maintenance occupations 
 Educational services, and health care and 
social assistance 
EduTrans positive real 
(location quotient) 
Production, transportation, and material 
moving occupations 
 Educational services, and health care and 
social assistance 
ArtsInd positive real 
(location quotient) 
All  Arts, entertainment, and recreation, and 
accommodation and food services 
ArtsMgt positive real 
(location quotient) 
Management, business, science, and arts 
occupations 
 Arts, entertainment, and recreation, and 
accommodation and food services 
ArtsServ positive real 
(location quotient) 
Service occupations  Arts, entertainment, and recreation, and 
accommodation and food services 
ArtsSales positive real 
(location quotient) 
Sales and office occupations  Arts, entertainment, and recreation, and 
accommodation and food services 
ArtsNR positive real 
(location quotient) 
Natural resources, construction, and 
maintenance occupations 
 Arts, entertainment, and recreation, and 
accommodation and food services 
ArtsTrans positive real 
(location quotient) 
Production, transportation, and material 
moving occupations 
 Arts, entertainment, and recreation, and 
accommodation and food services 
ServInd positive real 
(location quotient) 
All  Other services, except public administration 
ServMgt positive real 
(location quotient) 
Management, business, science, and arts 
occupations 
 Other services, except public administration 
ServServ positive real 
(location quotient) 
Service occupations  Other services, except public administration 
ServSale positive real 
(location quotient) 
Sales and office occupations  Other services, except public administration 
ServNR positive real 
(location quotient) 
Natural resources, construction, and 
maintenance occupations 
 Other services, except public administration 
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ServTrans positive real 
(location quotient) 
Production, transportation, and material 
moving occupations 
 Other services, except public administration 
PubInd positive real 
(location quotient) 
All  Public administration 
PubMgt positive real 
(location quotient) 
Management, business, science, and arts 
occupations 
 Public administration 
PubServ positive real 
(location quotient) 
Service occupations  Public administration 
PubSale positive real 
(location quotient) 
Sales and office occupations  Public administration 
PubNR positive real 
(location quotient) 
Natural resources, construction, and 
maintenance occupations 
 Public administration 
PubTrans positive real 
(location quotient) 
Production, transportation, and material 
moving occupations 











    with open(file, 'rt') as d: 
        std = csv.reader(d, delimiter=',') 
        data = [row for row in std] 
        header = data[0] 
        data = data[1:]   
    d.close() 
    return data, header 
     
def csvopen(file): 
    with open(file, 'rt') as d: 
        std = csv.reader(d, delimiter=',') 
        data = [row for row in std] 
    d.close() 
    return data 
 
def createcsv(filename, data, header): 
    with open(filename, 'wt', newline = "") as t: 
        initial = csv.writer(t, delimiter=',' ) 
        initial.writerow(header) 
        initial.writerows(data) 
    t.close() 
    print(filename, 'created') 
 
def csvdictopen(file): 
    with open(file) as csvfile: 
        reader = csv.DictReader(csvfile) 
        data = [row for row in reader] 
    csvfile.close() 
    return data 
     
def createdictcsv(filename, data): 
    headerD = [] 
    csvForm = [] 
    for key in data[0]: 
        headerD.append(key) 
    for row in data: 
        RowToA = [] 
        for hdr in headerD: 
            RowToA.append(row[hdr]) 
        csvForm.append(RowToA)    
         
    print(headerD) 
    with open(filename, 'wt', newline = "") as t: 
        initial = csv.writer(t, delimiter=',' ) 
        initial.writerow(headerD) 
        initial.writerows(csvForm) 
    t.close() 












states = { 
        'AK': 'Alaska', 
        'AL': 'Alabama', 
        'AR': 'Arkansas', 
        'AS': 'American Samoa', 
        'AZ': 'Arizona', 
        'CA': 'California', 
        'CO': 'Colorado', 
        'CT': 'Connecticut', 
        'DC': 'District of Columbia', 
        'DE': 'Delaware', 
        'FL': 'Florida', 
        'GA': 'Georgia', 
        'GU': 'Guam', 
        'HI': 'Hawaii', 
        'IA': 'Iowa', 
        'ID': 'Idaho', 
        'IL': 'Illinois', 
        'IN': 'Indiana', 
        'KS': 'Kansas', 
        'KY': 'Kentucky', 
        'LA': 'Louisiana', 
        'MA': 'Massachusetts', 
        'MD': 'Maryland', 
        'ME': 'Maine', 
        'MI': 'Michigan', 
        'MN': 'Minnesota', 
        'MO': 'Missouri', 
        'MP': 'Northern Mariana Islands', 
        'MS': 'Mississippi', 
        'MT': 'Montana', 
        'NA': 'National', 
        'NC': 'North Carolina', 
        'ND': 'North Dakota', 
        'NE': 'Nebraska', 
        'NH': 'New Hampshire', 
        'NJ': 'New Jersey', 
        'NM': 'New Mexico', 
        'NV': 'Nevada', 
        'NY': 'New York', 
        'OH': 'Ohio', 
        'OK': 'Oklahoma', 
        'OR': 'Oregon', 
        'PA': 'Pennsylvania', 
        'PR': 'Puerto Rico', 
        'RI': 'Rhode Island', 
        'SC': 'South Carolina', 
        'SD': 'South Dakota', 
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        'TN': 'Tennessee', 
        'TX': 'Texas', 
        'UT': 'Utah', 
        'VA': 'Virginia', 
        'VI': 'Virgin Islands', 
        'VT': 'Vermont', 
        'WA': 'Washington', 
        'WI': 'Wisconsin', 
        'WV': 'West Virginia', 





baseDir = 'Data/ACS/' 
 
acss = ['ACS_05_EST_S2405_with_ann', 
        'ACS_06_EST_S2405_with_ann', 
        'ACS_07_1YR_S2405_with_ann', 
        'ACS_08_1YR_S2405_with_ann', 
        'ACS_09_5YR_S2405_with_ann', 
        'ACS_10_5YR_S2405_with_ann', 
        'ACS_11_1YR_S2405_with_ann', 
        'ACS_12_1YR_S2405_with_ann', 
        'ACS_13_1YR_S2405_with_ann', 
        'ACS_14_1YR_S2405_with_ann'] 
 
years = [i for i in range(2005, 2015)] 
     
def hdrcsvopen(file): 
    with open(file, 'rt') as d: 
        std = csv.reader(d, delimiter=',') 
        data = [row for row in std] 
        header = data[1] 
        data = data[2:]   
    d.close() 
    dicData = [] 
    indeces = [] 
    for head in header: 
        #these are a few of the heading that will not be used. This just simplifies things a bit 
        if 'Error' not in head and 'IMPUTED'  not in head and 'Farming, fishing, and forestry' not in head and head != '': 
            g = header.index(head) 
            indeces.append(g)          
    for row in data: 
        rowadd = {} 
        for ind in indeces: 
            rowadd[header[ind]] = row[ind] 
        dicData.append(rowadd)            
    newheader = [] 
    for ind in indeces: 
        newheader.append(header[ind]) 
    return newheader, dicData 
 
with open(baseDir+'acsheadermapping.csv', 'rt') as d: 
    std = csv.reader(d, delimiter=',') 
    data = [row for row in std] 
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    header2 = data[0] 
    headerdata = data[1:]  
d.close() 
 
headers = [] 
allheads = [] 
counter = 0 
allData = [] 
for acs in acss: 
    header, datadict = hdrcsvopen(baseDir + acs+'.csv') 
    for row in header: 
        if row not in headers: 
            headers.append(row) 
    allheads.append(header) 
    for row in datadict: 
        row['Year'] = str(years[counter]) 
        allData.append(row) 
    print(str(years[counter]))         
    counter += 1 
 
''' 
had to manually map the fields of ACSs prior to 2010 to 2010 and after 
 
Farming, fishing, and forestry is not in post 2009 data 
for i in range(len(allheads)): 
    for head in header: 
        if head not in allheads[i]:     
            print(head, i) 
''' 
 
for head in headerdata: 
    for row in allData: 
        if head[0] in row: 
            row[head[1]] = row[head[0]] 
 
 
goodheader = [] 
for row in headerdata: 
    if row[1] != '': 
        goodheader.append(row[1]) 
#print(goodheader) 
 
#back into an array 
 
newdata = [] 
for col in allData: 
    datarow = [] 
    for row in goodheader: 
        datarow.append(col[row]) 
    newdata.append(datarow) 
print(len(newdata), len(newdata[0]), len(newdata[-1]))        
         
 
 
begin = 4 




for row in range(len(newdata)): 
    g = 0 
    pop = float(newdata[row][begin]) 
    while g + spacing < len(newdata[row]): 
        col = begin+g 
 
        if newdata[row][col] == '-': newdata[row][col] = 0 
         
        newdata[row][col] = float(newdata[row][col]) 
        total = newdata[row][col] 
        newdata[row][col] = newdata[row][col]/pop 
 
        i = 0 
        while i < spacing - 1:      
            i += 1 
            if newdata[row][i+col] == '-': newdata[row][i+col] = 0 
            newdata[row][i+col] = (float(newdata[row][i+col])/100)*total/pop 
 
        g += spacing  
     
print(newdata[0]) 
 
allLqs = [] 
averages = [] 
for year in years: 
    yearOfData = [] 
    for row in newdata: 
        if row[3] == str(year): 
            yearOfData.append(row) 
    for col in range(begin, len(yearOfData[0])): 
        yearColAve = {} 
        count = 0 
        for i in range(len(yearOfData)):            
            count += yearOfData[i][col] 
             
        if count == 0: print('error count = 0', col, yearOfData[i]) 
        yearColAve['average'] = count/len(yearOfData) 
        yearColAve['colNum'] = col 
        yearColAve['year'] = year 
        averages.append(yearColAve) 
    print(year, 'len', len(yearOfData))    
     
alllqs = [] 
count = 0 
for row in averages: 
    for i in range(len(newdata)): 
        if newdata[i][3] == str(row['year']): 
            for g in range(begin, len(newdata[i])): 
                if g == row['colNum']: 
                    newdata[i][g] = newdata[i][g]/row['average'] 
 
         
for row in newdata: 
    for key in states: 
        if states[key] in row[2]: 
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            state = key 
    firstCol = row[2].split() 
    if firstCol[2].isdigit(): 
        district = firstCol[2] 
    else: 
        district = '0' 
         
    row.append(state) 
    row.append(district) 
     
 




     
print(newdata[0]) 
st.createcsv(baseDir+'CleanLQ20052015v2.csv', newdata, goodheader) 
 
import stLib as st 
import pickle 
from datetime import datetime 
 
#there are three file that are needed for this. The LQ by district file, the bill and industries affected file, and the roll 
call file 
#the years can be pulled from the bills csv 
 
path = 'data/' 
indAff, indHeader = st.hdrcsvopen(path+'IndustryAffectedBySanctions20052015.csv')  
 
indYears = 0 
indLeg = 1 #the legislation number 
indCon = 2 #the congress 
 
''' 
need to account for the years in the LQ file 
''' 
years = [] 
for row in indAff: 
    years.append(row[indYears]) 
 
distLQ, lqHeader = st.hdrcsvopen(path+'ACS/CleanLQ20052015.csv')  
 
lqState = -2 
lqDist = -1 
 




rollcon = 1 
rollleg = 4 
 
#format 4-Jan-2005 




rollsOfInterest = [] 
 
for roll in rollcall: 
    appended = False 
    for ind in indAff: 
        if ind[indLeg] in roll[rollleg] and ind[indCon] == roll[rollcon]: 
            rollyear = datetime.strptime(roll[0], dateFor) 
            rollyear = rollyear.year   
            disyear = datetime.strptime(ind[0], '%Y') 
            disyear = disyear.year             
                 
            if appended == False:                     
                r = roll 
                for g in ind: 
                    r.append(g) 
                rollsOfInterest.append(r) 
                appended = True  
print(len(rollsOfInterest), 4380) 
fullRegress = [] 
 
for rolls in rollsOfInterest: 
    appended = False 
    for dis in distLQ: 
        rollyear = datetime.strptime(rolls[0], dateFor) 
        rollyear = rollyear.year   
        disyear = datetime.strptime(dis[0], '%Y') 
        disyear = disyear.year 
        if rolls[12] == dis[lqState] and rolls[3] == dis[lqDist] and rollyear == disyear: 
            if appended == False: 
                r = rolls 
                 
                if r[13] == 'No' or r[13] == 'Nay': 
                    vote = 'no' 
                elif r[13] == 'Yea' or r[13] == 'Aye': 
                    vote = 'yes' 
                elif r[13] == 'Voting': 
                    vote = 'notVoting' 
                         
                for g in dis: 
                    r.append(g) 
                     
                r.append(vote) 
                fullRegress.append(r) 
                appended = True 
header = [] 
for row in rollsHeader: 
    header.append(row) 
for row in indHeader: 
    header.append(row) 
for row in lqHeader: 
    header.append(row)    
header.append('voteBin')    
 






header = ['name', 'state' ] 
           
csvData = [] 
 
for year in years: 
    interim = [] 
    missings = [] 
    print(year) 
    with open(path + 'rollsDist'+year+'.pickle', 'rb') as handle: 
       data = pickle.load(handle) 
      
     
    for row in data: 
        if row['district'] == None: 
            missings.append(row) 
        if 'name' not in row: 
            print(row) 
             
    for line in missings: 
        liner = [] 
        for head in header: 
            if head in line: 
                liner.append(line[head]) 
        interim.append(liner) 
     
    for row in interim: 
        if row not in csvData: 
            csvData.append(row) 
         
st.createcsv(path+'missings.csv', csvData, header) 
 
sanctData = [] 
forCSV = [] 
count = 0 
nameData, header = st.hdrcsvopen(path+'nameFileUpdate.csv')  
 
for year in years: 
    print(year) 
    with open(path + 'rollsDist'+year+'.pickle', 'rb') as handle: 
        data = pickle.load(handle) 
     
    header = [key for key in data[0]] 
    header.sort() 
     
    for row in data: 
        csvdata = [] 
        if row['district'] == None: 
            named = False 
            for cc in nameData: 
                if row['name'] == cc[0] and row['state'] == cc[2] or row['name'] == cc[0] and row['state'] == 'XX': 
                    row['district'] = cc[1] 
                    named = True 
            if not named: 
                count += 1 
                print(row['name'], row['state'])     
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        if row['sanction'] == 1: 
            sanctData.append(row) 
            for bow in header: 
                csvdata.append(row[bow]) 
            forCSV.append(csvdata) 
 
 
    with open(path + 'FullNamerollsDist'+year+'.pickle', 'wb') as handle: 
        pickle.dump(data, handle) 
     
     
with open(path + 'SanctionsVotes.pickle', 'wb') as handle: 
    pickle.dump(sanctData, handle) 
print(len(sanctData))     
     
st.createcsv(path+'SanctionsVote.csv', forCSV, header) 
 
### this is for determining which reps were in which districts on which years.  
 
def createdictcsv(filename, data): 
    headerD = [] 
    csvForm = [] 
    for key in data[0]: 
        headerD.append(key) 
    for row in data: 
        RowToA = [] 
        for hdr in headerD: 
            RowToA.append(row[hdr]) 
        csvForm.append(RowToA)    
         
    print(headerD) 
    with open(filename, 'wt', newline = "") as t: 
        initial = csv.writer(t, delimiter=',' ) 
        initial.writerow(headerD) 
        initial.writerows(csvForm) 
    t.close() 
    print(filename, 'created') 
     
     
dateformat = '%Y-%m-%d' 
year = 2000 
RepsPerYear = [] 
years = ['2006-02-02', '2007-02-02',  
         '2007-02-02', '2009-02-02', '2010-02-02', '2011-02-02',  
         '2011-02-02', '2012-02-02', '2014-02-02', '2015-02-02'] 
 
for year in years: 
    year = datetime.strptime(year, dateformat) 
    for row in data: 
        for col in row['terms']: 
            if col['type'] == 'rep': 
                endyear = datetime.strptime(col['end'], dateformat) 
                #endyear = endyear.year 
                startyear = datetime.strptime(col['start'], dateformat) 
                #startyear = startyear.year 
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                if startyear <= year and endyear >= year and col['state'] != 'VI' and col['state'] != 'GU' and col['state'] != 
'PR' and  col['state'] != 'AS': 
                    rowToAdd = {'year': year.year, 
                           'firstname': row['name']['first'], 
                           'lastname': row['name']['last'], 
                           'district': col['district'], 
                           'state': col['state'], 
                           'term': col, 
                           'start': col['start'], 
                            'end': col['end']} 
                    RepsPerYear.append(rowToAdd) 









baseDir = 'Data/ACS/' 
 
acss = ['ACS_05_EST_S2405_with_ann', 
        'ACS_06_EST_S2405_with_ann', 
        'ACS_07_1YR_S2405_with_ann', 
        'ACS_08_1YR_S2405_with_ann', 
        'ACS_09_5YR_S2405_with_ann', 
        'ACS_10_5YR_S2405_with_ann', 
        'ACS_11_1YR_S2405_with_ann', 
        'ACS_12_1YR_S2405_with_ann', 
        'ACS_13_1YR_S2405_with_ann', 
        'ACS_14_1YR_S2405_with_ann'] 
         
def hdrcsvopen(file): 
    with open(file, 'rt') as d: 
        std = csv.reader(d, delimiter=',') 
        data = [row for row in std] 
        header = data[1] 
        data = data[2:]   
        dicData = [] 
        for row in data: 
            rowadd = {}         
            for i in range(len(header)): 
                rowadd[header[i]] = row[i] 
            dicData.append(rowadd)            
    d.close() 
    return dicData 
 
import stLib as st 
import pickle 
from datetime import datetime 
 
#this is just a simple script to generate a binary variable for if Rep vote in teh same way as their party 
 




data, header = st.hdrcsvopen(path+'SanctionsVoteRegression20052015v1.csv') 
 
roll = 9 
legnum = 4 
party = 8 
vote = 127 
 
eachbill = [] 
 
for row in data: 
    rowapp = [row[legnum], row[roll]] 
    if rowapp not in eachbill: 





eachWithVote = [] 
 
for col in eachbill: 
    repY = 0 
    demY = 0 
    repN = 0 
    demN = 0 
    repV = 0 
    demV = 0 
    numRep = 0 
    numDem = 0 
    for row in data:     
        if row[legnum] == col[0] and row[roll] == col[1]: 
            if row[party] == "R": 
                numRep += 1 
                if row[vote] == "yes": 
                    repY += 1 
                if row[vote] == 'no': 
                    repN += 1 
                if  row[vote] == 'notVoting': 
                    repV += 1 
            if row[party] == "D": 
                numDem += 1 
                if row[vote] == "yes": 
                    demY += 1 
                if row[vote] == 'no': 
                    demN += 1 
                if  row[vote] == 'notVoting': 
                    demV += 1     
     
    print(numDem, numRep) 
    demYes = demY/numDem 
    demNo = demN/numDem 
    demNV = demV/numDem 
 
    repYes = repY/numRep 
    repNo = repN/numRep 
    repNV = repV/numRep 
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   a = {'leg': col[0],  
         'roll': col[1],  
         'demY': demYes, 
         'demN': demNo, 
         'demV': demNV, 
         'repY': repYes, 
         'repN': repNo, 
         'repV': repNV} 
    eachWithVote.append(a) 
print(eachWithVote) 
 
apptoNA = 0 
for i in range(len(data)): 
    if data[i][party] == "R": 
        for row in eachWithVote: 
            if row['leg'] == data[i][legnum] and row['roll'] == data[i][roll]: 
                if data[i][vote] =='yes': 
                    data[i].append(row['repY']) 
                elif data[i][vote] =='no': 
                    data[i].append(row['repN']) 
                else: 
                    data[i].append(row['repV']) 
 
 
    elif data[i][party] == "D": 
        for row in eachWithVote: 
            if row['leg'] == data[i][legnum] and row['roll'] == data[i][roll]: 
                if data[i][vote] =='yes': 
                    data[i].append(row['demY']) 
                elif data[i][vote] =='no': 
                    data[i].append(row['demN']) 
                else: 
                    data[i].append(row['demV'])     
    else: 
        data[i].append(apptoNA) 
     
header.append('voteWparty') 









BaseURL = 'http://clerk.house.gov/evs/' 
startYear = 1950 
endYear = 2016 
rolls = ['000', '100', '200', '300', '400', '500', '600', '700', '800', '900'] 
 
votese = [] 
 
for year in range(startYear, endYear): 
    for roll in rolls: 
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        try: 
            g = urllib.request.urlopen(BaseURL + str(year) + '/ROLL_' + roll +'.asp') 
            soup = BeautifulSoup(g.read(), 'html.parser') 
                     
            g = soup.find_all('td') 
            i = 0 
            while i+11 < len(g): 
                k = [] 
                h = 0 
                while h <= 11: 
                    k.append(g[i+h]) 
                    h += 1 
                 
                i = i + h 
                votese.append(k) 
        except:           
            print(year, roll) 
 
headers = ['', '']#['', '', 'Date', 'RollcallNum', 'Majority', 'LegislationNum', 'Congress', 'Session', 'AmmendmentNum', 
'Result']  
 
with open('somebillz.csv', 'wt', newline = '') as t: 
    initial = csv.writer(t, delimiter=',' ) 
    initial.writerow(headers) 
    initial.writerows(votese) 
t.close() 
 




years = ['1990', '1991', '1992', '1993', '1994', '1995', '1996', 
         '1997', '1998', '1999', '2000', '2001', '2002',  
#years = [ 
         '2003', '2004', '2005', '2006', '2007', '2008', '2009', '2010', 
         '2011', '2012', '2013', '2014', '2015'] 
 
states = ['AL','AK','AZ','AR','CA','CO','CT','DE','FL', 
          'GA','HI','ID','IL','IN','IA','KS','KY','LA','ME', 
          'MD','MA','MI','MN','MS','MO','MT','NE','NV','NH', 
          'NJ','NM','NY','NC','ND','OH','OK','OR','PA','RI', 
          'SC','SD','TN','TX','UT','VT','VA','WA','WV','WI', 
          'WY','AS','DC','FM','GU','MH','MP','PW','PR','VI'] 
           
 
path = 'data/' 
dist, header = st.hdrcsvopen(path + 'CongressToDistrictCurrentPlus1900Rep.csv') 
bid = 18 
 #important fields in the congressional district are 1 through 7 plus the boiguide_id 
rollTots = [] 
textonly = re.compile(r'"\w+"') 
 
header = ['name', 
          'district',  
          'vote',  
          'desc', 
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          'rollcall-num', 
          'majority', 
          'legis-num',  
          'congress', 
          'session',  
          'vote-result',  
          'action-date', 
          'sanction', 
          'party', 
          'state' 
          ] 
missingData = []          
nameFile = [] 
for year in years: 
    rolls, header2 = st.hdrcsvopen(path + 'RollCalls'+year+'.csv') 
    print(year) 
    #the roll calls are poorly formatted:  
     
    #Column 1:  
    #<recorded-vote><legislator name-id="A000014" party="D" role="legislator"  
    #sort-field="Abercrombie" state="HI" unaccented-name="Abercrombie">Abercrombie 
    #</legislator><vote>Present</vote></recorded-vote> 
     
   # or 
   # <recorded-vote><legislator party="D" role="legislator" state="NY"> 
   # Ackerman</legislator><vote>Present</vote></recorded-vote> 
     
   # Column 2: 
   # [None, '1', 'D', 'QUORUM', '110', '2nd', 'Passed', '15-Jan-2008', 0] 
   # which corresponds to the headers: 
   # vote-desc rollcall-num majority legis-num congress session vote-result action-date 
    data = [] 
    g = 0 
    for i in range(len(rolls)): 
        rolls[i][1] = eval(rolls[i][1]) 
        roww = {'desc': rolls[i][1][0], 
                'rollcall-num': rolls[i][1][1], 
             'majority': rolls[i][1][2], 
              'legis-num': rolls[i][1][3],  
                 'congress': rolls[i][1][4], 
             'session': rolls[i][1][5],  
                 'vote-result': rolls[i][1][6],  
                 'action-date': rolls[i][1][7], 
                 'sanction': rolls[i][1][8], 
                 'district': None 
                 } 
 
        frd = textonly.findall(rolls[i][0]) 
        for p in range(len(frd)): 
            frd[p] = eval(frd[p]) 
            if len(frd[p]) == 1: 
                roww['party'] = frd[p] 
            if len(frd[p]) == 2: 
                roww['state'] = frd[p]             
 
        if float(year) < 2003: # there is a format change at for all records after 2003 
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            ff = re.sub(r'<.*?>', ' ', rolls[i][0]) 
            ff = ff.split(' ') 
            qq = []         
             
            for row in ff: 
                if row: 
                    qq.append(row) 
             
            roww['nameVote'] = qq 
            roww['vote'] = qq[-1] 
            roww['name'] = qq[0] 
             
            qq = ','.join(qq) 
 
            for row in dist: 
                if row[0] in qq and row[5] == roww['state']:                 
                    roww['name'] = row[0] 
                    roww['district'] = row[6] 
                    g += 1 
 
        else: 
            ff = re.sub(r'<.*?>', ' ', rolls[i][0]) 
            ff = ff.split(' ') 
            qq = []         
            for row in ff: 
                if row: 
                    qq.append(row) 
             
            roww['nameVote'] = qq 
            roww['vote'] = qq[-1] 
            roww['name'] = qq[0] 
             
            for gg in frd: 
                for row in dist: 
                    if row[bid] in gg:     
                        roww['name'] = row[0] 
                        roww['district'] = row[6] 
                        #print(row[bid], frd, roww) 
                        g += 1 
         
            if 'name' not in roww: 
                for row in dist: 
                    for qq in frd: 
                        if row[0] in qq and row[5] == roww['state']:                 
                            roww['name'] = row[0] 
                            roww['district'] = row[6] 
                            g += 1 
 
        if 'name' not in roww and frd not in missingData: 
            missingData.append(frd) 
        else: 
             
            data.append(roww) 
            nameforFile = [roww['name'], roww['district'], roww['state']] 
             
            if nameforFile not in nameFile: 
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                nameFile.append(nameforFile) 
         
    csvData = [] 
    for line in data: 
        liner = [] 
        for head in header: 
            if head in line: 
                liner.append(line[head]) 
        csvData.append(liner) 
         
    st.createcsv(path+'RollCallDist'+year+'.csv', csvData, header) 
     
    with open(path + 'rollsDist'+year+'.pickle', 'wb') as handle: 
        pickle.dump(data, handle) 
 
    print('data', g,', Rolls', len(rolls)) 
 
st.createcsv(path+'nameFile.csv', nameFile, ['name', 'district', 'state']) 
st.createcsv(path+'missingData.csv', missingData, ['bid', '']) 
 
 
#with open(path + 'rollsWithDist.pickle', 'wb') as handle: 
#  pickle.dump(data, handle) 
import stLib as st 
import pickle 
 
years = ['2005', '2006', '2007', '2008', '2009', '2010', 
         '2011', '2012', '2013', '2014', '2015'] 
 
path = 'data/' 
header = ['name', 'state' ] 
           
csvData = [] 
 
for year in years: 
    interim = [] 
    missings = [] 
    print(year) 
    with open(path + 'rollsDist'+year+'.pickle', 'rb') as handle: 
       data = pickle.load(handle) 
      
     
    for row in data: 
        if row['district'] == None: 
            missings.append(row) 
        if 'name' not in row: 
            print(row) 
             
    for line in missings: 
        liner = [] 
        for head in header: 
            if head in line: 
                liner.append(line[head]) 
        interim.append(liner) 
     
    for row in interim: 
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        if row not in csvData: 
            csvData.append(row) 
         
st.createcsv(path+'missings.csv', csvData, header) 
 
sanctData = [] 
forCSV = [] 
count = 0 
nameData, header = st.hdrcsvopen(path+'nameFileUpdate.csv')  
 
for year in years: 
    print(year) 
    with open(path + 'rollsDist'+year+'.pickle', 'rb') as handle: 
        data = pickle.load(handle) 
     
    header = [key for key in data[0]] 
    header.sort() 
     
    for row in data: 
        csvdata = [] 
        if row['district'] == None: 
            named = False 
            for cc in nameData: 
                if row['name'] == cc[0] and row['state'] == cc[2] or row['name'] == cc[0] and row['state'] == 'XX': 
                    row['district'] = cc[1] 
                    named = True 
            if not named: 
                count += 1 
                print(row['name'], row['state'])     
        sanctData.append(row) 
        for bow in header: 
            csvdata.append(row[bow]) 
        forCSV.append(csvdata) 
 
 
    with open(path + 'FullNamerollsDistV2'+year+'.pickle', 'wb') as handle: 
        pickle.dump(data, handle) 
     
     
with open(path + 'SanctionsVotes.pickle', 'wb') as handle: 
    pickle.dump(sanctData, handle) 
print(len(sanctData))     
     









BaseURL = 'http://clerk.house.gov/evs/' 
startYear = 1991 
endYear = 2016 
largestRoll = 1000 
146 
 
keywords = ['Sanction', 'sanction', 'SANCTION', 'tariff', 'Tariff', 'TARIFF', 'trade', 'Trade', 'TRADE'] 
 
votese = [] 
 
def gettext(name): 
    try: 
        x = soup.find(name).string 
    except: 
        x = '' 
    return x  
 
values = ['vote-desc', 'rollcall-num', 'majority', 'legis-num', 'congress', 'session', 
          'vote-result', 'action-date'] 
 
for year in range(startYear, endYear): 
    theVotes = [] 
    for roll in range(0, largestRoll): 
        try: 
            if roll < 100 and roll > 9: 
                ur = BaseURL + str(year) + '/roll0' + str(roll) +'.xml' 
                g = urllib.request.urlopen(ur) 
            if roll < 10: 
                ur = BaseURL + str(year) + '/roll00' + str(roll) +'.xml' 
                g = urllib.request.urlopen(ur) 
            if roll > 99: 
                ur = BaseURL + str(year) + '/roll' + str(roll) +'.xml' 
                g = urllib.request.urlopen(ur) 
     
            soup = BeautifulSoup(g.read(), 'html.parser') 
            info = [] 
            for val in values: 
                textin = gettext(val) 
                info.append(textin) 
             
            sanction = 0 
            #print(info) 
            if info[0] is not None: 
                for word in keywords: 
                    if word in info[0]: 
                        sanction = 1 
            info.append(sanction) 
            somevotes = soup.find_all('recorded-vote') 
            if len(somevotes) > 0: 
                for row in somevotes: 
                    m = [row, info] 
                    theVotes.append(m) 
                print(year, roll, 'Good') 
        except: 
              print(year, roll, ur) 
     
    headers = ['', '', 'vote-desc', 'rollcall-num', 'majority', 'legis-num', 'congress', 'session', 
              'vote-result', 'action-date']  
     
    with open('RollCalls'+str(year)+'.csv', 'wt', newline = '') as t: 
        initial = csv.writer(t, delimiter=',' ) 
        initial.writerow(headers) 
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        initial.writerows(theVotes) 
    t.close() 
     
print('done') 
 
with open('somebillz19902016.csv', 'rt') as d: 
    std = csv.reader(d, delimiter=',') 
    bills = [row for row in std] 
    #headers = std(next) 
d.close() 
 
years = ['1990', '1991', '1992', '1993', '1994', '1995', '1996', 
         '1997', '1998', '1999', '2000', '2001', '2002', '2003', 
         '2004', '2005', '2006', '2007', '2008', '2009', '2010', 




Necessary Conditions for Environmental Sanctions Appendix  
Code Appendix 
(Python 3.4) 
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- 
""" 




import math  
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt 
from scipy.optimize import minimize 
 
def createcsv(filename, data, header): 
    with open(filename, 'wt', newline = "") as t: 
        initial = csv.writer(t, delimiter=',' ) 
        initial.writerow(header) 
        initial.writerows(data) 
    t.close() 
    print(filename, 'created') 
     
 
c = 10.25 
#xm = x[0] 
#xd = x[1] 
#dm = x[2] 
#dd = x[3] 
 
#welfare = c*(math.log(x[0], math.e) + 0.7*math.log(x[1], math.e)) -(x[2]*0.611*x[0] + 
x[3]*0.311*x[1]) 
 
#this ensures consumption is non-negative 
bnds = ((1e-10, None), (1e-10, None), (None, None), (None, None)) 
 
#this puts the function and the constraints into the minimizer 
fun = lambda x: (-(c*(math.log(x[0]) + 0.7*math.log(x[1])) - (x[2]*0.611*x[0] + 
x[3]*0.311*x[1]))) #this is the objective function it is neagtive b/c the function is a minimizer 
 
# these are the constraints with the initial values. This is used to get the initial pollution level.  
inicons = ({'type':'eq', 'fun': lambda x: x[2] - 1 },  
         {'type':'eq', 'fun': lambda x: x[3] - 1.38 }) 
 
iniresults = minimize(fun, (1,1,1,1), method='SLSQP', bounds=bnds, constraints=inicons) 
 
pollutiond = iniresults.x[1]*0.311 
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pollutionm = iniresults.x[0]*0.611 
pollution = (pollutiond+pollutionm) 
hm = 1 
hd = 1 
 
x = [hd] 
y = [iniresults.x[1]] 
 
numbers = [] 
 
for t in range(0, 100): 
    hd = t/100 + 1 
    hm = hd 
    pol1 = math.sqrt(pollutiond)* math.log(hd)*1.3543 + 1.38  
     
    pol2 = math.sqrt(pollutionm) * math.log(hm)*1.3543 + 1  
     
    print(pol1, pol2) 
    cons = ({'type':'eq', 'fun': lambda x: x[0] - c/(0.611*x[2])},  
            {'type':'eq', 'fun': lambda x: x[1] - .7*c/(0.311*x[3])}, 
            {'type':'eq', 'fun': lambda x: x[2] - pol2 },         
            {'type':'eq', 'fun': lambda x: x[3] - pol1 }) 
 
    results = minimize(fun, (1,1,1,1), method='SLSQP', bounds=bnds, constraints=cons) 
    pollutiond += results.x[1]*0.311 
    pollutionm += results.x[0]*0.611 
        
    x.append(hd) 
    y.append(results.x[0]) 
     
    obj = c*(math.log(results.x[0]) + 0.7*math.log(results.x[1])) - (results.x[2]*0.611*results.x[0] 
+ results.x[3]*0.311*results.x[1]) 
    obj2 = c*(0.7*math.log(results.x[1]+results.x[0])) -  
results.x[3]*0.311*(results.x[1]+results.x[0]) 
     
    row = [results.x[0], results.x[1], results.x[2], results.x[3], obj, obj2, hd, hm, pollutionm, 
pollutiond] 
    numbers.append(row) 
 
#cons = ({'type':'eq', 'fun': lambda x: x[2] - pollution * math.log(hd)*1.3543 },  
#         {'type':'eq', 'fun': lambda x: x[3] - pollution * (0.537*hm - math.log(19345))}) 
header = ['xm', 'xd', 'dm', 'dd', 'oObj', 'nObj', 'hd', 'hm', 'pollutionm', 'pollutiond'] 
createcsv('graphs.csv', numbers, header) 
#(results) 
pollutiond = iniresults.x[1]*0.311 
pollutionm = iniresults.x[0]*0.611 
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numbers2 = [] 
for t in range(0, 100): 
    hd = t/100 + 1 
    hm = hd 
    pol1 = math.sqrt(pollutiond)* math.log(hd)*1.3543 + 1.38  
     
    pol2 = math.sqrt(pollutionm) * math.log(hm)*1.3543 + 1  
     
    print(pol1, pol2) 
    cons = ({'type':'eq', 'fun': lambda x: x[0] - c/(0.611*x[2])},  
            {'type':'eq', 'fun': lambda x: x[1] - .7*c/(0.311*x[3])}, 
            {'type':'eq', 'fun': lambda x: x[2] - pol2 },         
            {'type':'eq', 'fun': lambda x: x[3] - pol1 }) 
 
    results = minimize(fun, (1,1,1,1), method='SLSQP', bounds=bnds, constraints=cons) 
    #pollutiond += results.x[1]*0.311 
    #pollutionm += results.x[0]*0.611 
        
    x.append(hd) 
    y.append(results.x[0]) 
     
    obj = c*(math.log(results.x[0]) + 0.7*math.log(results.x[1])) - (results.x[2]*0.611*results.x[0] 
+ results.x[3]*0.311*results.x[1]) 
    obj2 = c*(0.7*math.log(results.x[1]+results.x[0])) -  
results.x[3]*0.311*(results.x[1]+results.x[0]) 
     
    row = [results.x[0], results.x[1], results.x[2], results.x[3], obj, obj2, hd, hm, pollutionm, 
pollutiond] 
    numbers2.append(row) 
header = ['xm', 'xd', 'dm', 'dd', 'oObj', 'nObj', 'hd', 'hm', 'pollutionm', 'pollutiond'] 
createcsv('graphs2.csv', numbers2, header) 
 
''' 
hm = 1 
hd = 1 
x = [] 
y = []# [iniresults.x[0]] 
for t in range(100): 
    hd += t/1000 
    hm += hd/2 
 
    dd = pollution * hd*0.537 + 1.38    
    dm = pollution * math.sqrt(hm) + 1 
 
    xm = c/(0.611*dm) 




    pollutiond += math.sqrt(xd*0.311) 
    pollutionm += math.sqrt(xm*0.611) 
 
    pollution = (pollutiond+pollutionm)     
     
    x.append(hd) 
    y.append(xd) 





A Time-Series Analysis of Sanctions from 1990-2015 Appendix 
Country Averages 






















































































































































































Iran* 1996 0 0 -1 -5 0 0     1 4 
Iran* 2007 0 0 -2 0 1 0 5 2 1 0 
Iraq 1990   0       2         
Russia 2012 0 0 1 0 -4  0  0   
Venezue
la 2014   0 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 
Average   0 0 -0.5 -1.25 -0.75 0.5 
3.3333
33 3.5 0.5 
1.3333
33 
                          
Medi
um 
Cuba* 1992 3 4 -5   0      
Libya 1996 3 5   2 2 0     0 1 
Iraq 2003   0   4 -4 5     2 3 
Lebanon 2007 4 0 0 0 5 -1 0 0 -3 -4 
Belarus 2006 0 -4 0 0 4   -5 -3 2 0 
Average   2.5 1 
-
1.6666
67 1.5 1.75 1 -2.5 -1.5 0.25 0 
                        
                          






Moldova 2012 -1.25 0 0 0 0 0 -3.33 -1 -1 1 
Russia 2012 0 0 1 0 -4   0   0   
Lebanon 2007 4 0 0 0 5 -1 0 0 -3 -4 
















la 2014     0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 
Libya 1996 3 5   2 2 0     0 1 
Average   3 5 0 1 1 0 5 5 0 0.5 




Iran 1996 0 0 -1 -5 0 0     1 4 
Iran 2007 0 0 -2 0 1 0 5 2 1 0 
153 
 
Iraq 1990   0       2         
Cuba* 1992 3 4 -5   0      
Belarus 2006 0 -4 0 0 4   -5 -3 2 0 















Moldova 2012 -1.25 0 0 0 0 0 -3.33 -1 -1 1 
Belarus 2006 0 -4 0 0 4   -5 -3 2 0 
Average   -0.625 -2 0 0 2 0 -4.165 -2 0.5 0.5 
              
Medi
um 
Iran 2007 0 0 -2 0 1 0 5 2 1 0 
Venezue
la 2014   0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 
Libya 1996 3 5   2 2 2     0 1 
Russia 2012 0 0 1 0 -4  0  0   
Lebanon 2007 4 0 0 0 5 -1 0 0 -3 -4 
Average   1.75 
1.2




33 -0.4 -0.75 
                          
Low 
Iraq 1990  0    2      
Cuba* 1992 3 4 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Average   3 2 -5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
                        
 
 






















































































































































































GDP High Russia 2014 -2.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 





0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.0 0.0 0.0 
Average 
 
-2.0 0.0 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.0 0.0 0.0 
             










   





3.0 3.0 -5.0 5.0 -2.0 -1.0 2.0 -3.5 
             
Low Zimbab
we 
2003 -1.0 2.0 -5.0 0.0 -5.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 -2.0 0.0 
Burundi 2015 -5.0 
 







0.0 0.0 3.0 1.0 
  
0.0 4.0 
CAR 2014 5.0 -5.0 
 
-5.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Average 
 
-0.3 -1.5 -1.7 0.0 -1.8 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.8 1.0 
              
              





Russia 2014 -2.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 





0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.0 0.0 0.0 
Burundi 2015 -5.0 
 





-3.5 0.0 2.3 1.7 -1.7 -2.5 0.0 -5.0 1.7 0.0 
             
Neither Zimbab
we 
2003 -1.0 2.0 -5.0 0.0 -5.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 -2.0 0.0 
CAR 2014 5.0 -5.0 
 
-5.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Average 
 
2.0 -1.5 -5.0 -2.5 -2.5 2.5 0.5 0.0 -1.0 0.0 







0.0 0.0 3.0 1.0 
  
0.0 4.0 
              




Medium Iraq 2014 
 
0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.0 0.0 0.0 
Zimbab
we 
2003 -1.0 2.0 -5.0 0.0 -5.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 -2.0 0.0 
Russia 2014 -2.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 





-1.5 0.7 0.7 0.0 -1.7 0.0 0.5 -2.5 -0.7 0.0 
             
Low CAR 2014 5.0 -5.0 
 










Burundi 2015 -5.0 
 












1990 Iraq 1.80E+11 -9 7.70 
1993 Cuba 2.24E+10 -7 13.19 
1997 Sudan 1.17E+10 -7 5.34 
2003 Zimbabwe 5.73E+09 -4 32.40 
2005 Zimbabwe 5.76E+09 -4 33.55 
2006 Belarus 3.70E+10 -7 60.06 
2006 Sudan 3.58E+10 -4 19.07 
2007 Lebanon 2.46E+10 6 38.23 
2008 Zimbabwe 4.42E+09 -4 41.47 
2010 Somalia 5.35E+09 -5 14.56 
2011 Libya 3.47E+10 -4 54.83 
2012 Somalia 5.35E+09 -5 14.56 
2012 Yemen 3.21E+10 -2 41.26 
2014 CAR 1.69E+09 -1 4.54 
2014 DRC 3.28E+10 5 36.37 
2014 Iraq 2.24E+11 2 39.42 
2014 South Sudan 1.33E+10 0 20.15 
2014 Russia 2.03E+12 4 27.54 




Side-by-side Comparison: EO versus CA 
 






























































GDP Difference: Congressional 
Sanction 
High GDP - Low GDP










































Exports: High Dependance to 
Low Dependance
High Exports -
Low Exports
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